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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to investigate if
regionalism in India would cause the secession of any of its
parts into independent states.
Two case studies are used: North-East India and Punjab.
North-East India is examined during the years of riots
which developed into large scale violence from 1979 to the
signing of an agreement between New Delhi and Assam in 1985.
Punjab was studied from India's post-independence
status through the 1984 violence at the Golden Temple, which
led to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and
to the signing of the accord between New Delhi and moderate
Sikh leader Harchand Singh Longowal.
The thesis concludes by reiterating the theme of "unity
through diversity" and illustrates that regional problems in
India can be contained when the central leadership in New
Delhi is responsive and deliberate in its actions.

v

INTRODUCTION
This thesis is entitled "Regionalism In India" and
delves into the problem of regionalism, primarily prior to
the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh
extremists.

In January 1985, her son, Rajiv Gandhi coasted

to a landslide victory for Prime Ministership, while winning
more than 50% of the popular vote for the first time in
history.1

The decisive mandate reflected in part a longing

in India for security and continuity.2

Rajiv has managed to

appease various minority groups partially, launch his
campaign against corruption, use business school theories
and computer readouts3 rather than consulting astrologers,
and combine tradition with innovation.4
Hence under his guidance the socio-economic and political
situation has continued fairly smoothly, and will be used to
substantiate my thesis that regionalism will not cause the
disintegration of the Indian Republic.
My thesis will be divided into several chapters.

The

introduction will deal briefly with various views on the
term "regionalism" as understood by political scientists
Harry E. Moore, Merril Jensen, Jyotirindra Das Gupta,
Clifford Geertz and Louis Snyder.
Moore uses the term "regionalism" in a narrow concept,
emphasizing its geographic connotation with special focus on

climate and soil types,5 whereas Jensen undertakes an
intense study of American history and the formation of the
states to accomplish the task.
Das Gupta, Geertz and Snyder on the other hand display
a more comprehensive and adequate view of the subject.

They

link together the multi-faceted social, cultural, ethnic and
linguistic disparities between areas or regions which assist
in causing regional loyalties or attitudes.

Thus

regionalism for these individuals is not only geographic,
but all encompassing.
Das Gupta uses the term "regionalism" as an extension
of various local points of view and states that this could
help promote "political integration rather than
disintegration".6

Geertz expounds the argument of natural

versus civil ties, and Snyder utilizes the colonial
background and formation of independent states to exhibit
his attitude towards the subject.

The only difference being

that Geertz uses the term "primordial ties" and Snyder
"mini-nationalism" instead of "regionalism".
The first chapter of my thesis shall expound the
various views mentioned above on regionalism, but will also
use for the main body of literature Selig S. Harrison's
India:

The Most Dangerous Decade as an important source on

the history of the evolution of regional loyalties, and the
role they play in power politics in India.

2

The second chapter shall deal with the case study of
North Eastern

India and its importance for regional

politics in the country.

The North East during the period

between 1979-81 was in a state of turmoil regarding the
issue of whether "foreigners" should be allowed to vote.
These "foreigners" were people from the bordering states of
West Bengal, Nepal and Bangladesh.

The North Easterners

felt that too many outsiders, mainly Bengalis, would swamp
the vote in their own favor, shunting the native population
to the position of second class citizens.

Hence, they

revolted against this so called illegitimate vote, striking
against the government

and causing a total breakdown of all

communication within this region.

Naturally when the issue

could not be resolved through normal channels of
communication, President's rule was imposed, and after a
year of turmoil and turbulence, the situation was eventually
stabilized by the central authority.7
The various books which shall be used to facilitate the
writing of this chapter are Hill Politics in the North East
by Shibanikinkar Chaube, Conflict in Nagaland by V.K. Anand,
Social and Economic profile in North East India edited by B.
Datta Ray, Problems of the Hill Tribes. North-East Frontier.
1873-1962 by H.K. Barpeigoni and Minority Safeguards in
India by K.K. Wadhwa.

Regarding the daily events between

1979-81, various newspapers articles, journals and literary
magazines have also been utilized.
3

Both Hill Politics in the North East by Chaube and
Conflict in Nagaland by Anand, undertake a fairly detailed
study of the North Eastern region of India from the pre
colonial period through the 1970s, the major difference
being that Chaube blames separatist feeling in this region
on British meddling, whereas Anand imputes British
administrative efforts for similar results.

Both books deal

with the geographic, social, cultural, religious and
linguistic aspects of this region, and also focus on the
"psychological maladjustment" which gave birth to the
conflict of minds between the hill and plains people.
Social and Economic Profile in North East India uses a
geographic cum historical approach to demonstrate the
formation of various tribes on an ethno-linguistic basis.
The author states that this was the main reason for the
formation of separate states in North East India and
continues to provide a challenge to the proponents of
national unity in India.
H.P. Barpeigani's book on the problem of hill tribes
uses a totally diverse approach to the subject.

Barpeigani

believes that the drawing up of borders on the whim of
colonial powers did much to destroy the confidence of the
hill tries.

He states that with the introduction of the

Inner Line to the extension of control to the McMahon Line,
increased the contingency of border conflicts with China.
Thus a strong united Peoples Republic of China began to pose
4

a severe threat to the Indian government on its NorthEastern frontier and exacerbated the already unstable
situation in this region.

Barpeigani's account is based on

historical events and the publics attitude towards these
events.
Finally, K.K. Wadhwa's Minority Safeguards in India is
an important source of information regarding the Indian
Government's present policy towards the hill tribes.

Mr.

Wadhwa demonstrates through the use of Government data the
various concessions and exemptions made to these minority
groups in the North East.

He states that not only are they

exempt from the payment of income tax, but are also entitled
to unremunerated education facilities which include tuition,
stipends and scholarships, and specially reserved seats in
all Government controlled or owned, offices and facilities.
The third chapter of my thesis will deal with the
second case study, the Punjab.

Through the efforts of the

Indian Government with the Green Revolution, this region
became a vital area of food cultivation for the Indian
people.

Unfortunately in the late 1970's, Mrs. Gandhi's

proponents turned out to be her most fanatical opponents,
when under the guidance of their leader Sant Bhindranwale
they took over the prestigious Golden Temple at Amritsar and
converted it into an ammunition cache.

These militant Sikhs

demanded an independent state of Khalistan on the basis of
religion, and when Mrs. Gandhi refused to buckle under these
5

demands, they decide to turn the Punjabi countryside into a
battlefield.

Eventually, Mrs. Gandhi gave orders to the

Indian army to storm the temple, thereby killing
Bhindranwale.

Many politicians stated that this perhaps was

her greatest political blunder.

On November 1984, Mrs.

Gandhi was assassinated by two of her own Sikh bodyguards,
and communal riots between Hindus and Sikhs broke loose in
most of Northern India.

However, under the guidance of her

son Rajiv Gandhi as the new Prime Minister, the situation
appears to be under control, and legitimate Sikh demands are
being studied by the Indian Government.
The various books consulted on the subject were Indira
Gandhi Returns by Khushwant Singh, Minority Safeguards In
India by K.K. Wadhwa, Gandhi and the Punjab by S.L.
Malhotra, Dynamics of Punjab Politics by Dalip Singh and The
Evolution of the Sikh Community by W.H. McLeod.
Indira Gandhi Returns is an important book with regard
to achieving insights into the Prime Minister's character.
Mr. Singh, through his numerous interviews with Mrs. Gandhi
assists in the understanding of the Prime Minister's psyche,
and hence her attitude towards others, which helps the
reader to realize the reason she had retained her Sikh
bodyguards even after threats of assassination had been
issued from numerous quarters.
Minority Safeguards in India is an important source of
information on the formation of the state of Punjab on the
6

basis of separate linguistic needs, after indian
independence in 1947.
Gandhi and the Punjab on the other hand, deals with the
political mobilization of the Punjabi populace under the
direction of the Mahatma, before

independence.

The author

demonstrates how an apathetic region was converted into a
highly politicized state under the leadership of Gandhi.

He

also states the importance of control over the temples in
this region not only as a political but also a financial
leverage.
Dalip Singh's Dynamics of Punjab Politics is an
extremely important source not only on the geographic,
social and cultural aspects but also the political dimension
to the present day problems of Punjab.

Singh not only gives

his reader a historical background but also describes the
formation of the militant Akali Dal, the role it plays in
Punjabi politics, the importance of the Green Revolution,
and the impact of Congress Rule in this region.

Singh

concludes with a fairly concise overview of the situation in
the Punjab until the late 1970's.
Finally, The Evolution of the Sikh Community by W.H.
McLeod consists of five distinct essays of which only three
are pertinent to this thesis.

The usefulness of this book

lies in the fact that it provides a keen insight into the
composition of the Sikh body, its moral guidelines, ideals,
work ethics and relationship with the Hindu community.
7

The concluding and fourth chapter of my thesis will
present my main argument that regionalism will not cause the
disintegration of the Indian Republic.

Most of the above

sources will be used to augment this view.

Two additional

books, Conflict in Indian Society and Inside India Today
shall be utilized to counter my own views on the subject.
Conflict in Indian Society by V.B. Kulkarni is an excellent
book regarding the political situation in India during the
1960's which led to "regional chauvinism plus communal
disharmony",8 growing restiveness of the student community,
challenges by industrial laborers and depressed classes,9
causing the eventual "breeding storm"10 to continue to rage,
burdening the country's excessive population and leading to
frustration and despair amongst large sections of the
population.11
Inside India Today by Dilip Hiro defends a Marxist
point of view as against my own "centrist" position.

Hiro

is a strong champion of minority rights, however, the means
of achieving these rights has led him to take an unpopular
stand on the subject.
Finally, India in the 1980's by Philip Talbott shall be
utilized to demonstrate by means of fairly recent
statistics, the

progress made in independent India since

the Transfer of Power in

1947.

Talbott manages to show his

reader the enormous problems which the Indian government had
to over come, and the considerable amount of progress made
8

in most areas of development.
Besides books, various newspapers, literary magazines,
periodicals and journals shall also be utilized to help
demonstrate to the reader that even though regionalism has
existed from time immemorial, and does cause problems for
the Indian government , the disintegration on India is not
seen on the horizon, because underneath the surface, there
is a basic ideal of "unity in diversity" prevalent amongst
most people on

the Indian subcontinent.

#############
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CHAPTER 1
WHAT IS REGIONALISM?
In the first chapter, the evaluation of the concept of
regionalism will be reviewed, drawing on the views of
authors Harry E. Moore and Merrill Jensen, who have
researched the growth of regionalism in America, and the
totally divergent view point seen in the work of Jyotirindra
Das Gupta, Louis Snyder and Clifford Geertz.

Selig S.

Harrison's perspective on regionalism will provide a most
useful summary of this discussion, due to its particular
emphasis on the nature of regionalism in India.
Harry E. Moore states that in spite of its antiquity,
the
"...ideal of regionalism has not yet achieved a
clear-cut definition which would be acceptable to all
regionalists. A working idea of the notion might be
stated in some such terms as these:
A region is an area
large enough to display most social factors, distinctive
enough to make recognition fairly easy, and possessed of
a characteristic mode of life."1
Moore emphasizes that regionalism was "born of
geographic study" and "always has to do with space...:"2
"...people cluster together and form institutions of
various sorts which reach out into surrounding areas for
part of their support.
Cities and towns form an
hierarchy of points of influence; the metropolis
dominating the city, the city the town, the town the
hamlet, and the hamlet the countryside.1,3
11

However the influence has not always flowed in one
direction.

The rural districts also affect the cities,

acting as a conservative force and slowing down the
processes of change.4

Thus regionalism, as understood by

Moore, in an American context, is a natural phenomenon,
grown as a result of man's effort to
live together and supply common needs.5

It

offers an

escape from a national standardization and regimentation
which would lead in the direction of mediocrity.6

Similarly

it opposes the processes of disruption which would deny the
necessity of co-operation and peace with neighbors.7
Summarizing his views, he quotes the adage that "regionalism
promotes union, but not unity."8
Regionalism in America utilizes the "sectional concept"
to describe regionalism,

and employs William Craigie's

definition of the term section, as being

"a distinct part

of the country; a territory set apart by geographical,
economic, or cultural lines."9

The book ranges over the

period from about 1750 to 1900 opening with the
consolidation of the old, far-flung system of sections
within British America, it goes on to show how the "British
American" system of sections that existed up to the
Revolution was destroyed by war and independence, and was
replaced after 1783 by a new contracted "American" system of
sections.10

Differentiation between territories was made on

the basis of divergent economics.
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In 1763 British America

consisted of an immense tract of land and islands ranging
between the frigid and tropic zones.11

For example,

"...the valley of the St. Lawrence was narrowly
inhabited by a resident population relying on farming and
fur trading for support... Cape Breton and Nova Scotia
were distinct from the St. Lawrence country and were
recognized as such; timber-working, agriculture, and
fishing dominated their economical activities."12
A system of sections characterized by local,
differences and variations in climate and soil types was
also prevalent.

From "New Britain"

(Hudson's Bay) on the

north to the British West Indies on the south, the entire
area was divided into numerous sections.12

Behind and above

all these tidewater settlements which ranged from
Pennsylvania to Georgia lay the "back country", and this
"Indian country" beyond it, constituted still other sections
in the system of sections that was being evolved in British
America about 1765.14
Fenning and Collyer in A New System of Geography had
devoted a series of chapters to the subject of American
geography which bore the title "Of the Northern Part of the
British American Dominions, Particularly of the Countries
Bordering on Hudson's Bay; with

the Islands of New

Foundland, Cape Breton, and St. John."15

The following

chapter was entitled "Of Nova Scotia, Canada, New England,
New York, the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, and Maryland", and the
Continent of America, Particularly of Virginia, Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida."16
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Thus Fulmer Wood has summarized his stance on the
subject by indicating an emphasis on the geographic,
climatic and terra-types, together with local economics to
help differentiate one section or region from another.

He

summarizes that,
"...given time, there arrives the moment when men in
several sections looking at each other, and at
themselves, come to the realization that they are not as
their fellows are, nor are their fellows as they are.
Thus sectional consciousness has come to birth, and,
therewith, consciousness of differences between
kindred."l7
Jyotirindra Das Gupta in his book Language Conflict and
National Development delves deeper into the problem and
states that regionalism should be seen in its social,
political, ethnic and lingual context.

However, he stresses

the problem of language conflict, as the most important
aspect of regionalism, specially in developing areas.18

He

further argues that "both in Europe and elsewhere the
transformation of traditional societies into modern
political communities"19 was usually accompanied by
corresponding linguistic modernization.

However,

traditional societies appear to show extremes of linguistic
diversity,

in a sense that "in such societies,

administration, religious affairs, literary activity, and
ordinary communication tend to be carried on in different
languages."20

Thus in an traditional society the use of a

foreign language may be employed for administrative and
religious affairs, whereas a variety of local dialects are
14

employed by the general masses.21

Emphasizing John

Gumperz's view on the subject, he states that low literacy
and the considerable efforts needed for language training
tended to favor polarization of power in a relatively small
elite.22

Internal linguistic diversity thereby symbolized

extremes of social and political stratification.23
Das Gupta concludes by suggesting that there is no
reason to assume that sub-national or regional loyalties are
necessarily inconsistent with national loyalties.24

He

argues that social divisions are not automatically
translated into political cleavages.

Even when some of them

are politically translated into political cleavages, there
may be a wide variation in their direction, momentum and
consequences.

Hence, he reasons, not all political

cleavages are translated into open conflicts, and even when
they are, such conflicts may actually promote integration
rather than disintegration.25
Snyder and Geertz have investigated the question of
regionalism on the basis of its social, political, ethnic
and lingual contexts.

Snyder states that Asian nationalism

started as a progressive, liberating force, only to descend
into an unhealthy reaction after liberation.

Along with the

"creation of larger nationalisms came the expected plethora
of unsatisfied mini-nationalisms."26

The pattern of

centralization versus de-centralization was the same as on
other continents.27

Post independence governments found
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themselves enmeshed in the usual problem of how to deal with
minorities in a plural society.28
"Such conflicts extended to all corners of Asia:
Kachins
and Karens in Burma? Nagas in India; Sabahs, Sarawaks,
and Singapores in Malaysia? Muslims in the Philippines.
Everywhere in Asia it was the same story— the
centralized state versus rebel regionalists.1,29
These volatile peoples of Asia had their own ethnic,
religious and linguistic differences.30

Their communal

rivalries caused nation building to become a process of the
"utmost complexity."31

Hence, cultural and religious

differences were also accentuated by ethnic concerns.
Throughout the vast Asian continent there were feuds between
Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims.32

Added to religious and

racial differences were linguistic rivalries which "broke
the continent into a hodgepodge of opposing regionalist
factions."33

More than three thousand languages and local

dialects were distributed though Asia.34

Minorities were

seen to hold to their special linguistic affinity, a
practice which encouraged clashes with the central
authority.35
"The same kind of linguistic drive governing the
Basques in Spain, the Walloons in Belgium, and the
Quebecois in Canada impelled varied Asian peoples to
demand autonomy or independence."36
Finally, Snyder argues that invariably there are
unsatisfied ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural
sentiments resisting control from the center.37

"Unified

centralism was threatened with becoming a dissolving
factionalism, the familiar theme of an unsettled social
16

order throughout the world."38
Clifford Geertz does a thorough job of not onlyexplaining the term regionalism and applying it to several
contexts such as the Indonesian, Ceylonese, Iraqi, Kurdish
and Thai.

He states that:

"Regionalism has been the main theme in Indonesian
disaffection... The Tamil minority in Ceylon is set off
from the Sinhalese majority by religion, language, race,
region, and social custom? the Shiite minority in Iraq is
set off from the dominant Sunnis virtually by an intraIslamic sectarian difference alone.
Pan-national
movements in Africa are largely based on race, in
Kurdistan, on tribalism? in Laos, the Shan states, and
Thailand, on language.
Yet all these phenomena, too, are
in some sense of a piece. .. [of regionalism]1,39
Geertz furthers that each individual has one aim, which
is a search for an identity, and a demand that identify be
publicly acknowledged as being important, or "being somebody
in the world."40

Unfortunately, tensions soon begin to

develop between "...gross actualities of blood, race,
language, locality, religion or tradition and of the
steadily accelerating importance in this century of the
"sovereign state as a positive instrument for the
realization of collective aims."41
The author states that a more exact definition of the
nature of the problem of regionalism involved is that
considered as societies, the new states are abnormally
susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial
attachments as against civil ones.42

By a primordial

attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens" or
"assumed givens" of social existence.
17

"Immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but
beyond them the givens that stems from being born into a
particular religious community, speaking a particular
language, or even a dialect of a language, and following
particular social practices.
The congruities of blood,
speech custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable,
and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of
themselves."4 3
Hence one is bound to one's neighbor of kinsman, hence,
as a result not only of "personal affection, practical
necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation,

but

also because of some unaccountable absolute import
attributed to the very tie itself."44
Civil ties, on the other hand, are maintained not by
calls to blood and land, but by a vague, intermittent and
routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a
greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police power
and ideological exhortation.45
In conclusion, Geertz maintains the havoc that is
wreaked by both primordial and civil ties, has wrenched
societies in divergent directions causing "competing
loyalties of the same general order, on the same level of
integration."46

Thus we find that Clifford Geertz has given

us the most complete, and hence the most useful definition
of the term "regionalism" and its use will help towards the
general explanation of regional loyalties in present day
India.
Regionalism in India is an extremely complex issue, as
Selig S. Harrison has demonstrated.

The concept will be

developed here from an historical-physiographic perspective.
18

The earliest recorded traces of civilization in India
were the Dravidian, Monenjo Daro-Harappan civilization in
North-Western India, which date to about 5000 B.C.

These

early dravidian cultures were probably pushed southward by
the arrival of the Aryans from Persia some 1,500 years
later.47

The light skinned Aryan nomads who crossed India

from Persia brought with them a language (a branch of the
Indo-European linguistic family) which, evolving into
Classical Sanskrit, was to become the unifying medium of the
new composite Hindu civilization.4®

In the South, the dark

skinned Dravidian people, with their own distinct Tamilian
culture and script, developed as a parallel civilization
within the South Asian subcontinent.
Even within their North Indian limits however, northern
imperial rulers never established, up to Mughal times, more
than the loosest sort of political control over the regions
beyond their home bases.49

"Aggrandizement was a Hindu

monarchic ideal; annexation was not."50

Although to secure

his home base a king would occasionally annex his immediate
neighboring kingdoms, but he did so normally for pillage and
prestige and not for the extension of any permanent
machinery of bureaucratic power.51

When the empire

dissolved these annexed territories reverted back to their
old independent status as a matter of course.52

Thus in the

case of North India, the growth of separate regional
identities in Gujarat, Bengal and Assam,
19

for example,

persisted despite the recurrent subordination of these
regions to the dominant Ganges heartland.
It was the Aryans who eventually imposed form and
unity, discipline and order, on the culture which resulted
from the interchange with the earlier Dravidian and Austric
settlers? and the new Hindu scriptures, written in the
language of the Aryans, had as their setting North Indian
Aryan territory.53

Thus we see the early formation of

regional identities on the basis of race and language,
beginning to develop within the subcontinent.
Unfortunately, the political history of India cannot be
examined by itself and must also be viewed with an eye to
the physiographic differences within the country.

Geography

played an important role in the formation of various regions
within the country.

The west and east flow of so many

rivers in a country lying north to south, accentuated the
natural separation between the northern and southern plains,
and a vast tableland

in between.54

Harrison claims that soon India became sub-divided into
three broad regions.
"The Ganges plain and its appendages were the most
that any North Indian dynasty controlled..., the southern
plains and their outworks all that most southern rulers
say as their proper horizon, and the Deccan tableland
the province of middle Indian emperors..."55
In the north, the Ganges basin,

"one of the world's

greatest expanses of rich, tillable soil, was hemmed in by
the Himalayan ranges and the forested slopes and ragged
20

desolation of central India, which constituted a great
natural enclosure inherently destined for political
consolidation."56

K.M. Pannikar stated that the eastward

flow of the Ganges lead to the integration of populations in
a closed area bound together by the river and its
tributaries.57
In the center, the Krishna and G a d a w a r i rivers, rising
near the Arabian Sea and emptying some nine hundred miles
away on the other side of the peninsula, gave a coast to
coast unity to the Deccan.58
In the south, the Tamiland plains, stretching south and
west as the peninsula receded inland from the Andhra coast,
offered a decided contrast to the Deccan tableland lying
above and beyond.59
Thus with these historic-physiographic divisions
playing an important role, various regional, linguistic sub
cultures soon developed within India.

In the north the two

major linguistic forces were Pali and Prakrit.60

These

languages were passed on from generation to generation,
through an oral tradition, largely in the custody of the
priestly classes, substantially without change.61

Sometime

around the 7th century B.C., Sanskrit evolved as the
standardized language of the north.62

Sanskrit for many

centuries thereafter was the one language of culture amongst
the literati in all parts of India.63

Although universally

recognized as the language of culture, and widely used by
21

the priestly and intellectual classes all over the country,
classical Sanskrit was never the language of the common
people who resorted to the use of Prakrit as the form of
speech.64
The original Indo-Aryan Prakrit subsequently developed
into Apabhramshas or spoken languages of the masses which,
in their turn, evolved into the modern Indian languages.65
Thus from the root language sprang western Hindi,
Rajasthani, Gujarati, and Bengali.66

Hence each region in

Northern India developed its own language using Sanskrit as
its basis, in much the same way that the romance languages
of Europe evolved from Latin after the collapse of the Roman
Empire.
In the south, the Tamil language has the oldest
continuous literary tradition,
and Malayalam.67

followed by Kannada, Telegu

These languages were based on Dravidian a

totally different script and are spoken almost exclusively
in South India.

However, even today, when we speak of

linguistic areas or regions, we find that at the frontiers
of each region the transition form one language to the next
is not sudden but very gradual and almost imperceptible.68
In 1953 Andhra Pradesh was the first state formed in
response to popular demand for a state border coinciding
with a linguistic boundary.69

Thereafter many Indian state

borders were reorganized to accord with language limits:
Maharashtra state with the Marathi language, Gujarat with
22

Gujarati, Tamil Nadu with Tamil, Kerala with Malayalam, and
Karnataka with Kannada.70
Thus within each of the three basic arenas, regional,
linguistic and political identities took form, as
development progressed around agricultural core areas.71
However, Ashoke Dutt states that after language "the
most pervasive element within the cultural landscape of
India is religion.1,72

All traditions in India seem to be

related to the Hindu social order.73

Hinduism, a native

religion, has been defused throughout India form it s place
of origin within the Indus plains.74

The Aryans who

nurtured this religion form around 2,000 B.C.75 migrated
eastward, settling almost all of the Indo-Gangetic plain.76
The Aryans being racial but not religious fanatics77 found
no difficulty whatsoever in borrowing the gods of the
conquered races and giving them niches in their pantheon.78
Hence the historical development and intellectual expression
of Hinduism was the meeting and fusion of Aryan and nonAryan elements.

Unfortunately, in course of time, the fate

that befell the Dravidians befell the Aryans too, and they
in turn, were conquered by foreign races.79

But social

intercourse with the foreign races and to be prohibited in
order to preserve the racial purity of the Aryans.80

Hence

each community that was admitted into the all-embracing
Hindu fold, was organized into an independent social unit,
with a definite status and a code of its own.81
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In religious matters however, a more lenient attitude
was

a

d

o

p

t

e

d

.

People were allowed to worship any gods they

pleased and hold any vies they liked as long as these did
not seriously challenge the fundamental principles of social
organization.
Together with the development of Hinduism the caste
system also flourished.

This was a social rather than a

religious phenomenon, and is the product of many centuries
of immigration and geographical isolation.83

It was thus

evident that the earliest phase of the caste system resulted
from the conquest of one people by another of a different
skin coloring.84
grades:

The old divisions were separated into 5

Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaisyas

(merchants or agriculturalists), Shudras (artisans and
landless workers), and Pariahs (outsiders).85

Thus the

additions of vast numbers (something over 2,000) of minor
castes, either occupational, or due to conquests, and the
effects of colonization, had complicated the system
enormously.8 6
In the 6th century B.C., we witnessed the birth of a
spiritual movement in India called Buddhism.87

This was in

the nature of a reform movement within the Hindu fold.
Buddhism was founded by Gautama Buddha who was born in 62 3
B.C. at Lumbini (Northern India).88

The faith started with

the basic principles of rebirth and Karma which were then
accepted by Indian philosophers as truths.89
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The Karma

doctrine referred to the merits and demerits of a being in
his past existences which determine his condition in his
present life.90

Hence, on the death of a person, the only

thing that survived is not the soul, as the Hindus believed,
but the result of his action, speech and thought.91
About 2 50 years after the death of Buddha, the Indian
emperor Asoka (273 B.C. - 232 B.C.) embraced Buddhism and
sent Buddhist missionaries throughout India.92

Buddhism was

made the state religion and spread rapidly to China, Burma,
Ceylon, Tibet, Korea, Japan and Cambodia.
However, with the passage of time the number of
Buddhists have gradually depleted from India due to a
variety of causes.

The wealth of the monasteries and the

easy life soon attracted many undesirable and unworthy
tenants into the fold.

Also, the preponderance of monks

over the laity, and the ritualism of Buddhism in its later
stages detracted from its earlier simplicity and purity.
Finally, the reorganization and revitalization of Hinduism
under Sankara (788 - 850 A.D.) and the Muslim invasion of
India in the 18th century all aided to bring about the
decline of Buddhism on the Indian subcontinent.93
The 1981 census ed that the Buddhist population was
about 5 million.94

The concentration of Buddhists are to be

found in Maharastra and North-East India.

The Maharastra

neo-Buddhist movement was founded by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar who
converted to Buddhism at a special ceremony with a large
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number of his followers from the so-called "untouchable"
caste.95

This upset large sections of the Hindu

traditionalists who felt that these conversions would side
step the traditional caste system, thus elevating the lower
classes.
The Buddhists of the North-East, especially the Chakma
of the Chittagong and Lushai Hills and those Buddhists from
Arunachal and Assam belong to the same school of Buddhism
that prevails in Tibet.95

After the Third century B.C.,

when Asoka sent his son Mahendra and daughter Sanghmitra to
Sri Lanka on a Buddhist mission, three streams of Buddhism
developed in Asia.

One stream went to Sri Lanka, Burma,

Siam, Cambodia and Malaya.

Another flowed to central Asia,

and from there to China, Korea and Japan, and yet another to
Tibet.97
The Muslim conquerors who came to India, had a
traditional culture of their own and they believed that the
salvation of mankind could be achieved only through their
religion.98

They hated idolatry, and considered it their

duty to remove it from the world.99

They had definite

dogmas on religion, and the slightest deviation from them,
even in thought, was belied to lead to eternal damnation.100
While they held such strong views on religion, they had the
most lenient social code in the world.101

They were free

from many social prejudices and believed that all men were
equal in the eyes of God, and that social inequalities were
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man made.102

Thus Islam, was in nearly every respect, the

antithesis of Hinduism with its social rigidity and
spiritual anarchy.103
In their first onrush the Muslims were extremely
violent towards the Hindus.104

They destroyed Hindu temples

and idols, plundered and forcibly converted the Hindus and
put to the sword those who would not accept Islam.105

But

with the occupation of India, the Muslims became responsible
for the good government of the country and had to adopt a
more conciliatory attitude towards Hinduism, the professed
religion of the overwhelming majority of their subjects.106
Finally, the most modern Indian religion of any
substantial proportion is Sikhism, and was founded by Guru
Nanak in the Punjab in 14 69.107

Though Sikhism was

monotheistic and adopted both Hindu and Muslim beliefs, W.
H. McLeod states that this did not constitute a synthesis of
"Hinduism and Islam", but was a Sant synthesis, which Guru
Nanak
on in

"reworked according to his own genius, and passed
form unequalled by any other representative of the

tradition."108

However, under Guru Amar Das, the second

successor to Guru Nanak, various innovations were introduced
which must be seen as concessions to social needs, not as a
conscious shift in doctrine.109
During the period of Jahangir's rule (1605 - 1628
A.D.), due to the increase of Mughal hostility and fear of
the growing power of the Sikh Guru, there was a large
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increase of a substantial number of Jat members.

Jats were

a rural and agrarian community, with strong martial
traditions and for centuries constituted the elite of the
Punjab villages.110

Hence, the growth of militancy within

the Panth must be traced primarily to the impact of Jat
cultural patterns.

Yet it was only towards the end of 18th

century under the able leadership of Maharaja Ranjit Singh
that the Sikhs became a power to be reckoned with, and that
Sikhism became the e religion in the Punjab.111

The

religion remained confined mainly to it's area of origin
until the 19th century, when relocation through migration
took place.112
During the 1947 partition of India, may Sikhs from the
Western Punjab Plain in Pakistan, migrated to the Eastern
Punjab Plain in India.112

With the States Reorganization

Commission appointed in 1955 by Prime Minister Nehru, the
Akali Dal, the paramilitary political party of Sikh
nationalism,
state.114

increased their agitation for a "Sikh"

The demand for a separate state of the Punjab

(Punjabi Suba) was voiced not in communal, but in linguistic
terms.

Punjabi was the mother tongue of both Sikhs and

Hindus, but communal passions had led large sections of the
Hindu community to renounce the Punjabi language by naming
their mother tongue as Hindi for census tabulation.115
However,

in 19 66, supposedly as a concession to the valour

and suffering of the Sikhs in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965
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and partly due to the growing response in the Hindu speaking
areas for a separate state of Haryana, the government
announced that the Punjab would be divided into two units,
Punjabi Suba and Haryana, corresponding to the regions of
language dominance, thereby eventually satisfying Sikh
demands based on the "totality of language conflict

mixed

with religious intransigence."116
Thus we may conclude that regionalism in India was not
only historical, geographical, racial and lingual but was
also based on religious lines and that religion played a
very important role in regional politics.
Religion also molded many other aspects of Indian life.
In a society in which tradition surrounds its inhabitants,
where mobility is restricted for most persons, and where
life expectancy was quite brief until very recently,
religious attitudes have placed their stamp on a wide range
of cultural features and processes.117

A prospective

student of Indian society would shift his manner of greeting
from the generally used "namaste" in Hindi or "namascar" in
Tamil to a more specific religious greeting depending upon
the religious community of the person greeted.118

Thus, if

that person were a Muslim from the North West, the greeting
is "salaam walekum" in Urdu and

"Sat sihri akal" serves for

the Sikh who speaks Punjabi.119
A second cultural area in which the influence of
religion is pervasive is that of diet, food selection and
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customs. 120

Dietary habits in India are complex, regionally

varied and strongly orientated towards religion.121
Although most Hindus are vegetarians and will not consume
beef, some non-Brahmins are not strict vegetarians and will
eat fish, mutton and pork.122

Consumption of flesh among

Hindus is closely related to caste us, with higher ranking
castes exhibiting the greatest restrictions.123

Muslims on

the other hand eat all meat except pork, Christians and
parses have no taboos, whereas Buddhists and Jains are
strict vegetarians and therefore, do not consume any kind of
meat.124

The following example form the city of Calcutta is

particularly revealing:
"In Burrabazara area...we find a large number of
fruit stalls. Mechua Bazar Market has no fish or meat
stall.
This can be explained by the fact that the
community composition of that area is of non-Bengali
vegetarians.
In the Muslim and Christian dominated
localities there is a large concentration of beef stalls
in the markets...In bengali Hindu-dominated localities,
fish stalls predominate..."125
In conclusion, viewing the 5,000 year history of India
we may observe that it was conquered by several different
races, who spoke various languages, had special dietary
habits, and followed disparate customs.

It seemed natural

that the separate regions with distinctive regional
identities and loyalties would also evolve.

Thus, a growth

of regionalism began to take shape and this was soon to play
a major role in shaping the political focus of New Delhi to
the troubled areas of North East India and Punjab.
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CHAPTER 2
ASSAM AND THE NORTH EAST
In order to evaluate the thesis that regionalism will
not cause the disintegration of the Indian republic, two
case studies, North East India and Punjab, have been
utilized.

In both these areas we have seen mounting tension

leading to violence and bloodshed in the ten years from 197 6
to 198 6, and yet in both cases a measure of understanding
and rationality in centre-state affairs has helped alleviate
the problem.
North-East India consists of five states (Assam,
Nagaland, Tripura, Manipur, and Meghalaya) and two union
territories (Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) which form a
wedge between Bangladesh, Burma and China.1

This region is

enclosed by the "blue hills" that are made of the:
"..Eastern Himalayas on the north, the Naga Hills on the
east, the Mizo and Tripura Hills on the south, and the
Shillong plateau.... and Meghalaya on the west, form
almost complete natural boundaries of the Brahmaputra
Valley, the heartland of Assam."2
The entire region is connected to the rest of India by
a thin neck of West Bengal, that at one point, is scarcely
25 miles wide.3
For several centuries the valley and the hills of
north-eastern India have been exposed to waves of invasion
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and migration.

The province of Assam at the far

northeastern corner of India is a museum of nationalities.
Of them, the Garo, living in the western parts of the
Meghalaya plateau, had a legend of having migrated from the
northwest,

i.e. the southern side of central Tibet.

The

Khasi, at least some of them, claim to have migrated from
southeast Asia, part of their route probably passing through
Russia.

The Kuki and the Chin inhabiting the southern hills

of Manipur, Tripura, and most of the Mizo Hills, are
supposed to be from southern China.

The Naga, settled in

Nagaland and the northern hills of Manipur, and some of the
groups in the northeast are assumed to have immigrated from
eastern Tibet.4

Thus, the northeast frontier is not

inhabited by Indo-Aryans as is most of northern India, but
by nomadic Mongoloid tribes who have strong ethnic and
cultural connections with the people of China, Tibet, and
Burma.5
Significantly, not even one of the regions' seven
political units is bound by a common language of the
original fold.6

Arunachal Pradesh,

than 50 different languages.7

for example, has no less

The Ao Nagas cannot follow

the language of their neighbours, the Angami Nagas.8

The

Khasi speech is almost Greek to the Garo's, although they
belong to the same state, Maghalaya.9
The religious composition is no less complex.

Hinduism

reached the valley of Manipur probably in the 15th century,
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to which some Manipuri Brahmins trace their settlement.10
The Chakma of the Chittagong Hills, a section of whom are
now living in the Lushai Hills, profess Buddhism.11

Several

sections of people from northern Arunachal belong to the
same school of Buddhism as prevails in Tibet.12
Finally, since the late 19th century, Christianity has
been embraced in the Garo, Khasi, Mizo, Lushai, and Naga
Hills, by about half of the total population in this
region.13
Thus after the British secured and blocked the
boundaries of northeastern India, when they were eventually
opened up to the rest of the country, this geographic,
linguistic, ethnic, and racially isolated minority became
apprehensive and obsessed with self-preservation.14

Though

some observers may feel that the emotional links between the
people of the northeast and the rest of India is tenuous,15
in reality

the differences amongst these various tribes are

as wide as

the differences between them and the rest of

India.

older times, certainly, hostility among them

In

often went

deep.16

Today,regional ties and affiliations

exist in abundance in northeast India, but it is important
to note that this is not manifested in an individual seeing
himself as a northeasterner; he is more likely, even today
to see himself as Mizo, Naga, or Assamese.
This brief case study will consist of five parts.
After a brief description of the history of northeastern
39

India, causes of building tension will identified.

In the

third section, the events leading to the violence of 1979-84
will be probed.

Fourth, an analysis of the case will be

presented, and finally, a conclusion of the case of
Northeast India will complete the chapter.
History of the North-East
The British entered the northeastern frontier from
Bengal in the seventeenth century; as a result, the
communications network was centered in eastern Bengal.
Assam was left as an appendage rather than as an integral
part of British India.17

Early British records about the

hills of northeast India were almost uniformly contemptuous
of the "savage", "barbarous", and "primitive" tribes.

These

characterizations arose out of the hill peoples' dress, war
like habits, and attachment to the recently condemned
systems of headhunting, human sacrifice, and slavery.
Chaube states that the Angami, the legendary headhunters of
the Naga Hills, were brilliant terrace cultivators in the
pre-British days.

The rice yield of western Angami was

higher than the all-India average.

The Serna, another object

of early horror tales, had mastered the technique of
preparing salt from brine springs.18

Cotton was widely

cultivated and iron was in use in almost all the hills.19
The tools may have been primitive, but their skills were
not.

Chie Nakane in the 16th century praised the economic

system and method of wet-rice cultivation among the hill
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people.20
The immediate impact of British power on the hills was
territorial.

When in 1832, Upper Assam was restored to a

subordinate monarchy, the Prince was granted limited
authority on criminal justice and an unlimited authority on
civil justice.21

Civil laws of the hills societies were

based on customs of almost innumerable varieties, and so
long as they did not affect British commerce, the British
government had no intention of changing them.22
In 1872-73, however, the British saw an absolute
necessity for bringing under more stringent control the
commercial relations of the British subjects with those of
the frontier tribes.23

Therefore, the government came to

the conclusion that it was necessary to assume special
powers and lay down special rules for regulating the
relationship between the plains and the hill peoples.24
This regulation gave power to the Lieutenant Governor of
Bengal to prescribe the line to be drawn, "beyond which no
British subject, and certain classes of foreigners, could
cross without a license or pass."25

This Inner Line also

prohibited "any subjects living inside the area from moving
therein."26

Beyond this line the tribes were left to manage

their own affairs with only such interference on the part of
the frontier officers, in their political capacity, as might
be considered advisable by the British authorities.27

The

plains people argued that this was a device by which the
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British sought to alienate the tribal people from the
peoples of the plains and thereby promote their imperial
policies. It is true that the regulations were not enforced
against the Christian missionaries but were imposed rigidly
against the Indians, and that the Inner Line regulations
generated a separatist tendency in the tribal people. Some
have argued that much of the trouble in Nagaland and Mizoram
today may be attributed to it.28
Bardolai, who along with Nichols-Roy and B. N. Rau
drafted the Sixth Schedule of the Constituent Assembly,
debated that:
"it is not unknown to you that the rule of the British
government and the activities of the foreign missionaries
always went together... During the war, the then rulers
and officers developed in the minds of their tribal
people a sense of separation and isolation and gave their
assurances that at the end of the war they will be
independent states managing their affairs in their own
way.
They were made to believe that the entire hill
would be constituted into a province and put under some
irresponsible government.
You might possibly have read
in the papers that plans were hatched in England in which
the ex-governors of Assam evidently took part, to create
a sort of kingdom over time."29
However, the growth of British administration in this
region during the latter half of the 19th century and early
2 0th century necessitated the building of small townships
within the deep hills, the construction of pony or cart
roads over the hills, and the introduction of a monetary
system therein.30

During the two World Wars several hillmen

had the opportunity to join the armed services and travel
around the world.31
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Though trade was not unknown in the hills before the
arrival of the British in this region, the bulk of it was
done through a system of barter. Monetization of the entire
hill area took place with the spread of British
administration, and a small business community consisting of
shop keepers and petty contractors was born among the
natives.-*2

Thus, the offshoot of this limited monetization

together with the early success of education helped in the
creation of an embryonic middle-class among the indigenous
people.33
Upon the attainment of independence in 1947, New
Delhi's attitude was summarized by Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru, who stated that "we cannot allow matters to drift in
the tribal areas.

At the same time we should avoid over

administering these areas.

It is between these two extreme

positions that we have to function."34

Ironically, it was,

in fact, the very success of government policies in this
area which led to increased tension.
Causes of Building Tension
There are actually four easily identified causes of
building tension in the Northeast: firstly, the success of
the measures undertaken by the government; secondly, the
language conflict;

thirdly, the Bengali attitude towards

the indigenous peoples; and lastly, the volatile immigrant
issue.

Together these forces exacerbated existing tensions

and led to the problems, unrest, and violence of 1979.
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The initial cause of the increased friction which
developed in the Northeast from the 1950s through the 197 0s
has been attributed by some, to the "success of the measures
taken by the government.

These have led to an awakening

among the Schedule Tribes and given them the ability to
stand up against vested interests.

Now they are ventilating

their grievances."3 5
The measures undertaken by the government of India in
September 1950 were in pursuance of the provisions contained
in Articles 16(4) and 335 of the Indian Constitution, which
was intended to benefit these backward people, in more or
less the same way the U.S.A. has employed it s Affirmative
Action program.

They made reservations for previously

suppressed classes such as the Schedule castes, Harijans
(the untouchables)
Northeast),

and Schedule Tribes (peoples from the

in jobs under the government's control.36

Through recruitment by open competition as well as other
forms of recruitment, the reservation of posts for people
belonging to Schedule Tribes was sealed at 5% of all
vacancies, and in 1970 by orders issued by the Ministry of
Trade Affairs it was further increased to 7.5%.

The maximum

age-limit prescribed was also increased by five years in the
case of candidates belonging to Schedule Castes and Schedule
Tribes.37

The fee's prescribed for the admission to any

examination or selection to the service or post would be
reduced to one-fourth for these special classes.38
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Because the general level of literacy was lower among
these depressed or backward classes, the government of India
began a campaign for the active participation in the
educational development of these people.39

Besides the

liberal allocation of funds and constructive programs for
educational development, the government of India increased
educational facilities which included free tuition,
stipends, scholarships, free primary education, and the
initiation of success scholarship schemes for post-graduate
and research studies.40

Thus, it seemed to some that

greater educational facilities had made larger sections of
people more aware of their rights, and this new awareness
had led them to revolt against vested interests.
Another cause for an increasingly aggravated situation
was the language conflict and the Bengali attitude towards
the Assamese peoples.
Initially, the British did not suspect that the native
officers (who were aristocrats in their own society)
imported from Bengal to help administer Assam, which was
acquired in 1826, would usurp linguistic leadership and
replace indigenous Assamiya with Bengali.

But Bengalis who

settled in Assam as the British East India Company's
servants, exercised great influence on their masters.41
During those years of Bengal cultural resurgence and
upheaval, when Calcutta was the Capital of British India, a
large exodus of educated Bengalis went both to Assam and
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Orissa, to run the administration.

The Bengalis had a

natural advantage in being the first to acquire the English
language and British concepts, values and ideas, and both
the language and the ideas enabled them to run the Ra j .

In

the process Assamiya lost its position as the official
language for about three decades.

Although Assamiya was

restored as the official language of schools and law courts,
the Bengali language continued to play a dominant role in
many spheres.

Many Bengalis7 not only refused to recognize

Assamiya as a rich and separate language, but considered it
to be a vulgar dialect of Bengali.42

This may have been due

either to ignorance or to a deliberate attempt to slight the
indigenous language, but either way, its effect on the
attitudes of Assamese toward Bengali domination, of which
the language issue was a symbol, were long lasting.
Differences between these two peoples seemed to worsen,
especially after independence.

During the States

Reorganization Commission7s work in the 19 60s, West Bengal
began to demand that the Goalpara district of Assam be
attached to it7s state, which immediately provoked the
Assamese plea for the addition of Cooch Bihar to Assam.43
Though the States Reorganization Commission maintained the
status quo, the bitterness generated by the claims remained.
Hence, in the 1960s the debate over Assam7s official
language and language of instruction in college, between
Bengali and Assamiya only caused further aggravation.44
46

A further problem in the Northeast was the Bengali
attitude towards the indigenous population.

The Bengalis

even after independence maintained a stance of superiority
with regard to these people.

They seldom mingled or

participated in the cultural activities such as the "Bihar
Festival" in Assam.45

Naturally, to the native population

this smacked of the past British imperialist policies which
could hardly be tolerated in independent India.
The major cause for friction, which developed into
large scale violence in 1979, seemed to be the immigration
issue.
Until 1947 the Northeast had been a sparsely populated
region compared to the rest of India, and had been cut off
from it due to the previous British policy of strict
adherence to the Inner Line.

Land was so readily available

that traditional agriculture had been carried out by cutting
down and burning trees to fertilize the land, and the land
was cultivated until the soil became less productive, at
which time the people moved on to new plots of land.46

From

being left "largely to themselves" after independence,
during the 1950s and 1960s these hill people were confronted
with large scale immigration into their states by Bengalis,
Nepalis, Orriyas, Madhya Pradeshis and East Pakistanis
(later Bangladesh), who immigrated from areas of high
density to the last valuable open ground closest to them.47
Meanwhile, the inhabitants of those pockets in the northeast
47

had learned that they had rights, and that they were
threatened.48
Tripura state, where the native tribesman were
outnumbered by Bengalis by the 1960s, was often cited by
other residents of India's northeast as an example of what
would happen to them if they did not rid their state of
these "foreigners."

In Assam, by 1979, five million of the

state's nineteen million people were non-Assamese, and most
of these were accused by the native Assamese of infiltrating
from Bangladesh.49
Hence, the northeasterners were or became accustomed to
their geographic, ethnic, lingual, and historic isolation
and the new 'open door' policy of the Government of India
seemed to threaten not only their cultural and ethnic
traditions but also their political and economic status in
their own state.

These were the circumstances which set the

stage for the events which led to the violence in the region
in 1979.
Events Leading To The Violence
On Friday, November 2, 1979, in Assam, the local people
began agitating against the registration of up to 200,000
people who some Assamese organizations considered "illegal
aliens."

Mr. Y. B. Chavan, the Deputy Prime Minister in

Charan Singh's government, tried to squelch this threatening
electoral crisis arising out of a campaign against
"outsiders.1,50
48

The people who were the targets of these campaigns had
lived in Assam for years, in some cases contributing greatly
to the development of the forested region, which was
sparsely populated in Indian terms.

Part of this group came

from Bangladesh, Bengali-speaking Muslims who, during the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, fled the poverty of what was then
East Pakistan, and later became Bangladesh,
opportunities of Assam.51

for the

Another portion of those labeled

aliens was made up of the Bengali-speaking people from West
Bengal, and a third were Nepalese from neighbouring Nepal.52
At issue was a challenge to the registration of up to
200,000 people who were, some Assamese organizations
insisted,

"illegal aliens."

There were demands that the

names of these "foreigners" be stricken from the voter rolls
for the forthcoming elections in January,

1980.53

Bengalis

(from West Bengal), after calls were raised for
disenfranchising those alleged to be aliens, felt threatened
and quickly formed a group called the "Indian Citizens
Rights Preservation Committee" in Assam.54
In response to this group, the country's election
commission ordered that no name be struck from the voters
rolls before the Parliamentary elections in January.55

This

led to outcries from Assamese who claimed that the election
could well be determined by votes of people who were not
citizens and who might even be deported after the
elections.56

Since over 40% of the 19 million people in
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Assam were Bengalis, and at least 5 million were illegal
aliens, the Assamese now worried that through the electoral
polls these Bengalis could win a large portion of seats in
the state legislature and introduce numerous bills to suit
their own needs and purposes.

They felt this would be

detrimental to their own interests.
As the election approached, violence against
"foreigners" increased.

On December 12, 1979, the Central

Government in New Delhi instituted President's Rule in Assam
making it's administration under the direct control of New
Delhi.58
In December,

1979, the tension was further heightened

by the exchange of fire in Belonia (North East) between
India and Bangladesh.59

The dispute had occurred over a 44

acre patch of paddy and sugarcane along the Mahuri river, 8 0
miles south of Agartala, the capitol of Tripura.60

Farmers

from the Indian side had been cultivating this land.
year, Bangladesh claimed rights to the property.

That

Due to an

exchange of fire, the Tripura government had ordered the
raising of a protective embankment along Belonia and had
charged that the government of "Bangladesh is up to some
mischief and was deliberately trying to whip a minor dispute
into an international situation.61

This hostility between

the two countries helped to aggravate the tensions between
the North Easterners and the Bangladeshi inhabitants of
Assam.
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From January to April 1980, the situation was
relatively calm, but in May, once again clashes between
Assamese and Bengalis were reported.

Five Bengalis were

reportedly killed in fighting in the Tinsukia and Kamrup
districts of upper Assam.62

A curfew had been imposed in

the troubled areas where once again the Assamese demanded
the expulsion of "illegal aliens," and the Indian Army had
to patrol the important towns.63

The Assamese students had

intensified their protests by starting a nine day non
cooperation movement, which paralyzed work in Government
offices, banks, and other public services.

Picketing of oil

installations continued, blocking the flow of oil through
the pipeline leading from refineries outside,

for the fifth

consecutive month.64
The talks between the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi and
students were broken off when the students refused to accept
a stipulation that only those "foreigners," mostly Bengali
refugees from Bangladesh, who had entered the state since
1971 would be identified and deported.65

The student

leaders demanded that all those who had come since 1951
should be identified and disenfranchised as a first step to
their deportation or resettlement.66

Because the situation

became so tense, authorities jailed many student leaders.
Kumar Mahanta, President of the All Assam Student's Union,
one of the few not jailed, said that the agitators were
prepared for negotiations, provided the Indian Government
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stood by the Constitution and expelled illegal residents.67
He claimed that millions of illegal immigrants from
Bangladesh and Nepal enjoyed political rights in Assam and
that more people were crossing the unchecked borders
daily.68
By Tuesday, June 10, 1980, additional security forces
had been flown into Tripura and Assam to contain the
spreading violence.

New Delhi had declared two districts of

Tripura "disturbed areas" and ordered in Army and
paramilitary forces.

Mrs. Gandhi also hinted at a foreign

influence, namely the C.I.A., being behind all this
agitation.69
By this time, the inter-communal violence death-toll in
Assam was over 2000.70

There were reports from Bangladesh

that 7 00 bodies had been washed down by rivers from this
state.71

Shelter materials,

food, and drugs were sent by

the Government of India to help more than 200,000 rendered
homeless.72

The irony of the Government's situation was not

lost on the Western Press:
"...In colonial days the sort of unrest now spreading in
many parts of India would have been called 'native
uprisings.'
These days the Government officials speak of
'cultural clashes' and 'the rising self-confidence of
once shy tribal groups."78
In 1979-80 in Assam, Northeast India saw the worst
massacres in India since the blood baths that had
accompanied its partition almost 3 3 years earlier.

More

than 15,000 houses in two districts alone had been burned,
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the traffic had been crippled and supply trucks ran only in
convoys as protection against hit-and-run raids by rebelling
tribesmen who battled the Government security forces.

In

all, the Government arrested more than 1,500 persons in the
state of Tripura during the month of June, 198 0.

The

strikes and picketing in Assam, which had started in the
Fall of 1979 over the issue of who should be eligible to
vote in the January 1980 national elections, had turned into
India's largest mass demonstration since the "Quit India
Movement" that ended with India gaining her independence
from Great Britain in 1947.74
Violence spilled over from Assam to some of the other
states and Union territories in domino fashion.

In the

state of Nagaland, an underground movement arose which
called for a long war with the Indian authorities to gain
"the liberation of Nagaland."75

In Mizoram, the Mizo

Liberation Front claimed it assassinated 7 persons,
including 4 soldiers in July, 1980.

Unrest in Manipur had

caused 10,000 persons to flee the state by the summer of
1980.

Things were so unsettled in the Northeast that the

Indian Government refused foreign correspondents a visit to
this area.
'It's like fishing,' explained one Senior Home
Minister, when an attempt to use force against Assamese
picketers failed.

'When the fish pulls, you have to let up

on the line./76
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Hence, by July, 1980, Mrs. Gandhi's government was
beginning to maintain a go-slow approach, trying to keep the
peace and protect the minorities in the hope that the
Northeast region would cool down enough so that it could
deal with specific demands.77
In spite of the Government's efforts at conciliation,
the dissenters continued their stern opposition.

The All

Assam Student Group, generally acclaimed the leader of the
movement, on 9th July, 198 0 refused a new request by the
Prime Minister to end the strike.78

The student leaders

stated that the strike would continue until the Government
presented a programme that would guarantee the separate
identity of the Assamese people, and chided Indira Gandhi
for failing to stop the "repressive measures" in the
state.79

Northeast states wanted to preserve their separate

cultural and ethnic identities against the encroachment of
people they considered foreigners.
In August,

1980, hope of concluding the massive anti-

Government unrest first emerged in Assam.80

In an agreement

reached between the Government and student leaders in the
state, demonstrations against the immigrants were ended.
This agreement followed a ceasefire in the 14-month civil
war in neighbouring Mizoram.

It appeared that the

Government offered to deport all Bangladeshis who had
entered Assam illegally since 1971, while conferring alien
status without citizenship or the right to vote on those who
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entered the state before 1971.

However, there was little

the Government could do about the deportation of Bengalis
who had migrated to Assam from elsewhere in India.

Nor

would it have been an easy diplomatic task persuading
Bangladesh to take back people who had left that already
over-populated country during the past ten years.
With the failure of the talks October 27, 1980 between
the Indian and Bangladeshi Governments on this matter, once
again the Assamese renewed their drive for expulsion of the
immigrants.81
It was the view of Mrs. Gandhi's government that
agreeing to meet the demands of the Assamese student leaders
was impossible, since it would mean the uprooting of several
thousand Bengalis who had long been settled in Assam and had
no prospect of returning to their original homes.82

On

November 2, 1980, the ten-month blockade of oil
installations by demonstrators had reportedly come to an
end.

Troops arrested pickets at wells and started pumping

oil to the refinery at Gauhati.
Finally, the violence abated and on December 6, 1980.
One year of President's Rule ended when a new administration
made up of eight members of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's
Congress Party, took control of Assam's state government.83
Anwara Taimor, a trusted leader of the Congress Party, was
sworn in as Chief Minister, amid heavy security, and once
again the revival of local government was instituted.84
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However,

it was only in August of 1985 under the Prime

Ministership of Rajiv Gandhi that a "peace deal" with the
Assamese Chief Minister was signed and a measure of peace
ensued.85
Under this new accord between the Prime Minister and
the Assamese Chief Minister elections were to be held "soon"
in Assam.

The Central Government also bowed to the demands

by Assamese protestors and declared that all immigrants who
arrived in Assam after 1965 were to be disenfranchised.
addition,

In

immigrants who had arrived after 1971 were to be

deported.8^
This Assamese accord called for the then current state
legislature, elected in the disputed voting of 198 3 to be
dissolved.

A caretaker government was to take control until

after the new elections.

Additionally, certain unspecified

"legislative and administrative safeguards" were promised by
the Central Government "to protect the cultural, social and
linguistic identity and heritage" of the Assamese people.
The government also promised to intensify economic
development of the region.87
Newspapers and politicians proclaimed that the Assam
dispute had finally been "solved" by the accord.88

Mr.

Gandhi was hailed as having brought an attitude that
contrasted on the Assam issue with that of his predecessor
and mother, P.M. Indira Gandhi.

The Governor of Assam

Bhishma Narain Singh praised Mr. Gandhi for his "wisdom and
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statesmanship."89
Thus we find under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi,
years of disputes, violence and strife were resolved and a
new understanding and attitude was reached between the
Centre and Assam.

Finally, the Central Government had taken

the initiative and brought the North East's most troubled
state back into its fold.

The Centre, through Rajiv

Gandhi's pragmatism and political manoeuvering had managed
to resolve a decade of social, political and cultural
antagonism, and had created a climate of hope, cooperation
and empathy between Assam and the Centre.

Analysis of The Situation
The genesis and growth of this .regional outburst was
the accumulation of aggravations over several problems.
These problems had been initiated by British policy in the
northeast and were systematically ignored by the Indian
Government after independence.

Hence, decades of

shouldering ill-feeling and consequent inaction in this
region caused North Easterners to
take fate in to their own hands.

conclude that they had to
They decided that recourse

through violent means was the only answer to their plight.
The British policy of segregation, established by the
drawing of the Inner Line, helped to isolate and alienate
the hill people from the plainsmen.

The only community

allowed into this region by the authorities during the
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British rule had been the neighbouring Bengalis who had
assumed all senior posts during the British administration
of the region.

Bengali chauvinism spread from language to

attitudes and helped to alienate further the people in this
"closed society."
After the declaration of independence in 1947, the
government's attitude toward the northeast was similar to
that of the British,

in that they did not directly interfere

or intervene in the region, but, on the other hand, they did
nothing to prevent migration into the hills.

Due to

economic pressure on the land, mass migrations from
neighbouring West Bengal, East Pakistan (later Bangladesh),
and Nepal continued for three decades from 1947 70 1977.
The hillsmen found themselves swamped by people who not only
spoke different languages, wore different garments, showed
an ethnic diversity, and separate religious affiliations and
belonged to a completely different culture, but also owned
large portions of their land and controlled most of the top
administrative positions in the state.
Some Assamese viewed their situation as similar to the
Palestinian problem.
"To those who are aware of Jewish travails in Europe,
Israel's moral right to exist is unquestionable.
But
from the Palestinian point of view, Israel is only the
result of a forcible take-over of their land by people
who are backed by western money and arms."90
Behind the Assamese perception lies the peculiar
history of the demographic transformation of a frontier area
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within a relatively short period of time and its enduring
effects on the evolution of Assamese society.

The census

reveals that in 1971 Assam had a population of 15 million
people, of which only 6.5 were a result of natural
population growth among the ethnic Assamese.91

In effect,

the other 8.5 million, i.e., the majority, were assumed to
be migrants and their descendants.92

Hence, Baruah states

that:
"Such a high level of migration does not easily lead to
assimilation.
The shear logic of numbers argues against
harmony.
It is difficult to imagine any situation where
such a phenomenon would not cause social tensions and
resentment."93
There were primitive rebellions against the influx in
the 19th century when the hill peoples raided tea gardens.
In the plains the protest against immigration began in the
1920s, leading to the British Inner Line permit systems.94
"National and sub-national upsurges are often forms of
political intervention of the masses when institutional
channels fail to articulate public grievances.
Along
with demographic changes, structural underdevelopment has
been the inescapable fate of the frontiers..."95
"Stripped of all its abstractions, the Assamese fight
for their cultural identity to maintain their majority
status in Assam. It is against all historical logic to
expect Assamese sub-nationalism to die out because the
presence of 'foreigners' has become a fact of life, any
more than Palestinian nationalism can be expected to end
because Israel is a formidable reality."96
Baruah suggests that Assam's problems might require
further reorganization of the state by "lopping off" Bengali
speaking Cachan district and carving out a genuinely
Assamese speaking majority state to avert a "permanent
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Northern Ireland type of conflict."97
Article 6(a) of the Indian Constitution explicitly
recognizes the right to citizenship of a person if "he or
either of his parents or grandparents was born in India as
defined by the Government of India Act, 193 5.1,98

Hence,

migration to India after July 19, 1948 was categorically
permitted even by people who initially went to Pakistan.
The right to sanctuary and citizenship is not barred by time
no matter when a person chooses to come back, they shall be
deemed to have migrated to the territory of India after the
19th of July,

1948.99

Clearly, the founding fathers of the Indian Republic
would not have written these provisions if they had not felt
in 1949 that population shifts were bound to occur.
Besides migration,

the North Easterner's problems were

a culmination of post-independent India's mood of rising
expectations of growth and prosperity when the British had
departed and which remained unfulfilled after 1974.

Added

to this was the government of India's systematic help
extended in the educational sphere which aided the North
Easterner's understanding of the political situation.
Hence, when the economic and political landscape appeared
bleak, student leaders helped mobilize the once apathetic
masses into a large scale civil disobedience movement
against "foreigners."
Supplementing the problem was the Congress Party's
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dependence on minority votes.100

To counter Communist Party

activities and neutralize it s influence, Tripura's Congress
Party leaders assisted by transporting in refugees from
Comilla (in Pakistan) and other districts.101

This gamble

did not pay, but having acquiesced in these tactics, the
Congress leaders were not in a position to oppose other
groups which also found it profitable to connive at illicit
immigration.
Jute and sugar cane growers looking for cheap labor
were abetted by touts who provided an ever increasing supply
of illegal manpower and "jungle passports."102
Adding to this predicament of clandestine operations
along a 3,654 kilometre frontier was the attitude of both
the Union and State governments (at New Delhi, Tripura and
Calcutta) of turning a blind eye to these activities.
Naturally , this attitude inspired the activities of
agencies in India that found it rewarding to smuggle in
manpower.

Politicians, settlement officials, contractors,

land owners, employers, policemen, and border guards were
apparently "hand in glove" in a conspiracy that seriously
disturbed the demographic balance and created many of the
tensions that came to afflict the northeast.103
Herein lay the real danger of the 1980s.

Naga

insurgency, Metei chauvinism and the Mizo rebellion were
worry enough without adding an "open-door policy."104

Not

only did this alienate the original inhabitants but it also
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jeopardized the security of Bengalis who had lived in this
region for generations.
Finally, we find that New Delhi's "peace deal" with the
Assamese in 1985 brought in a measure of fresh hope for the
North-East.

This region, which has had sporadic outbursts

of violence throughout the 1980s is in more control of its
affairs and is willing to work within the constitutional
framework of the Indian government.

Rajiv Gandhi has

managed to take charge of the situation and bring a
recalcitrant region within New delhi's control through
political compromise and a fresh understanding of India's
problems.

Conclusion
The success of the measures undertaken by the
Government of India, the language conflict, Bengali
attitudes and the immigrant issue led to the problems in the
Northeast.
somewhat,

These problems were eventually resolved
in 1985, after years of violence.

This indifference and lack of swift action by the
central government in Northeast India did incalculable
damage to this region.
"It has caused high unemployment, tremendously increased
land prices, denuded forests, and led to the
appropriation of Khas Mahal estates.
In human terms it
has boosted smuggling, provided muscle for extremist
politics, fomented racial antagonism, and made evasion of
the law a way of life in the border marshes."105
However,

in spite of the violence and continuing
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grievances, the Government of India in 1985 managed to sign
an accord with the Assamese government which finally
promoted a measure of peace in this region.

Due to Rajiv

Gandhi's political acumen, peaceful measures were adopted
and the process of political resolution began to be realized
as a viable alternative after years of violence and
conflict.

Thus Assam was to be controlled by the Assamese

who would voice their feelings and concerns by selecting the
candidates of their choice in the new elections.
Thus we find that New Delhi's leadership was the
crucial element in the Assamese case.

When Mrs. Gandhi

manipulated the situation conditions became worse.

However,

when the central leadership in Delhi addressed the problems
in their own terms the case could be resolved.

#######
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CHAPTER 3
PUNJAB
History of the Sikhs
The Second case study undertaken describes regionalism
in the Punjab.

The chapter begins with a brief history of

the Punjab, linked with the birth and growth of Sikhism,
Punjab's dominant religion.

It proceeds to explain some of

the major causes of violence in the region from 1981 through
1984.

Finally, there is an analysis of the regionalism in

Punjab, followed by a short conclusion.
The name Punjab is derived from two Persian words, punj
(five) and ab (water), meaning five waters or rivers.1
From the Presidential address read at the first annual
meeting of the Punjab Historical Society (December 27,
1910), it was noted that:
"There are few places in the world, and certainly very
few on the continent of Asia, which present a more
entrancing field for historical research than the
Province of the Punjab.
It has from the beginning of
time, been the scene of more changes, more movement, than
any part of India..."2
Historically, this province was the traditional home of
those whose lives colored the Vedic scriptures, and
contained the site of the battlefield of the
Mahabharata.3
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Alexander and his army invaded India in 326 B.C. and
left traces of Greek civilization throughout the region, but
after their withdrawal all archeological evidence attested
to the supremacy of Buddhism in the Punjab.4

Following the

collapse of the great Hindu empires and with the arrival of
the Muslim Era, in the 13th century A.D. Punjab reached the
acme of its historic importance and lapsed "into something
very like a settled government."5
The founder of the Sikh faith, Guru Nanak, a Hindu
Kshatriya (or warrior caste), was born in 1469 A.D. in the
village of Tolwandi Rai Bhoi, now called Nankara Sahib.6

He

was not an ascetic recluse, unlike most Indian religious
leaders.

To Nanak, religion was not limited to symbols,

rituals, and scriptures, but was embedded in everyday life:
" Religion does not consist in a patched coat, a
Yogi's staff, or in ashes smeared on the body.
Religion
does not consist in mere words; he who looks on all men
as equals is religious.
Religion does not consist in
wandering to tombs or places of cremation, or sitting in
postures of contemplation... Abide pure among the
impurities of the world, thus shalt thou find the way of
religion."7
Guru Nanak's ministry was that of education and
enlightenment.

It was reserved for his successors to

amplify and translate his teachings into practice, an
evolutionary process in the context of which succeeding
gurus merged their personalities into that of their
founder.8
These gurus strengthened the unifying institutions,
popularized the punjabi script
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calling it Gurumukhi,

opposed the practice of purdah (veiling), led a vigorous
campaign against sati,

(widow self-sacrifice), composed the

Granth Sahib, and constructed a central place of worship,
the Golden Temple at Amritsar.9

Unfortunately, due to

Mughal religious intolerance and bigotry, the Sikhs turned
to arms as a means of "protection to the poor and
destruction to the tyrant.10
After the execution of Arjun (the 5th Guru)

in 1606

A.D. by the Mughals, the Sikhs slowly began to evolve from a
pacifist to a militant people.

The final transformation

came in 1699, when Guru Govind Singh organized his followers
into members of a fighting fraternity or Khalsa (meaning the
pure), through baptism, and enjoined them to wear the five
common symbols of the new order: Kesh (hair), Kangha (comb),
Kara (bangle), Kachha (underwear), and Kirpan (dagger).11
Thus Guru Govind Singh had not taken to military ways for
any political aggrandizement, but as a matter of selfdefense.
During the 1850s under British rule the Punjab soon
began to prosper.
created.

Old canals were re-opened and new ones

Extensive roads were built together with the

railway, postal, and telegraphic communications network in
the region.12

Thus, it is not surprising that when most of

north and east India revolted against the British in 1857,
Punjab, which had initially faced the Mughal onslaught
against its people, remained loyal to the British.
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Naturally, the British rewarded the Punjabis (mostly
Sikhs)

for their non-involvement in regional politics, by

classifying them a "martial race" and allotting them more
than proportional representation in the military.13

This

naturally irked other Indian communities not so generously
endowed with British favor, who soon began to resent Sikh
privileges.

Other Punjabi Hindu families for economic

reasons, often brought up their first born male as a Sikh to
accrue benefits and favors with the British.
Looking at the situation from a different perspective,
however, Khushwant Singh, argues that the Sikhs were taken
advantage of by both the British and later on the Indian
government.

He stated that within a few years of the

passing of Guru Govind Singh, Hindu ceremonies and rituals
crept back into the Sikh Gurudwaras (temples), creating
tension between the two communities by the threat of
absorption of the Sikhs into the Hindu fold.14
Sikh Gurudwaras, besides being places of worship were
also used as congregational centers, for socio-religious
activities, transmission of knowledge, and rest houses for
travellers.15

They were well endowed and not only had

revenues of large tracts of land attached to them, but also
accumulated enormous incomes through individual and
institutional offerings.16

Unfortunately, Sikh power and

prestige fell into the hands of Hindu priests who not only
controlled the ecclesiastical property but, over time, made
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their positions hereditary, and also introduced worship of
Hindu idols and reverence towards their customs.
Singh's point of view,

Thus, from

it was only natural for the Sikhs to

want the management and control of their shrines returned
into their own hands.
Finally, the Sikh community provided loyalty and whole
hearted support for the British during the First World War,
but their efforts went unrewarded politically, especially
compared to British treatment, during the same period, of
the Muslims.17

When the war ended, the Sikhs expected to be

compensated for their services.
"The community, which had done so much more than any
other in the war, which paid 4 0 percent of the land
revenue of the province and formed 25 percent of the
electorate, was treated with less consideration than...
the Muslims (who with a population of 10 percent in
Bihar), were given 3 3 percent representation.1,18
In 1919, at Jallianwalla Bagh, General Dyer lined up
his troops and fired on an unlawful but peaceful crowd,
unarmed civilians, many women and children, killing and
wounding over 1,500 people: this massacre, together with
British support of the Hindu priests concerning the temples,
finally caused 30,000 Sikhs to be jailed, 400 killed, and
2,000 wounded over a five year period.

The result was a

permanent wedge driven between the British and the Sikhs.19
The toll of the partition of the India in 1947 was the
heaviest for the Sikhs.

Nearly 2 percent of their

population was massacred during the riots and their economic
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losses were incalculable.20
According to

Maharaja Yadvindra Singh of Patiala:

"There was such a clamor among Hindus and Sikhs of the
Northwest to reach Patiala- to escape despoliation and
torture.
They came in swarms.
They came jampacked in
trains, huddled on rooftops, standing on footboards,
clutching onto handlebars.... A human tragedy on a vast
scale.
The word "refugee" suddenly acquired such
reality- such poignancy.21
After the partition the new province of Punjab retained
control of only 13 out of 29 districts of undivided
Punjab.22

All of the Muslim majority districts were

transferred to Pakistan and the non-Muslim majority
districts remained in India.

The new Punjab inherited only

3 4 percent of the area with 47 percent of the population of
what had been Punjab.22
As a result of the reorganization of India on a
linguistic basis, PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States
Union) was merged with Punjab on November 1, 1956.

The

Sikhs formed about one third of the state's population and
were concentrated in the western districts, whereas the hill
areas of East Punjab were organized into a new Union
Territory and called Himachal Pradesh.24

Punjabi and Hindi

were both official languages of the Punjab.

However, with

the persistent demand of a unilingual Punjabi speaking
state, the government of India announced in 1966 that the
Punjab would be divided into two units, Punjabi Suba (Punjab
speaking) and Haryana, corresponding to the regions of
language dominance.

The Sikhs now constituted a majority in
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the Punjab,

fifty-five percent of the population.

Thus we find that the Punjab, an area invaded by all
conquerors from northwest India evolved into a form of
settled government under the Muslim era and won favor, for a
time, under the British, only to be torn by the chaos of the
partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan in
1947.

The Sikh religion which emerged in this region only

attained a majority status in independent India after
November 1, 1966.

Hence, cultural, linguistic and a sense

of religious identity was fostered in this region from the
mid 1960s.
Causes of the Violence
The causes of the spread of disenchantment against the
government of India by the Sikhs can be traced to partition
and the coming of independence in 1947, and was the
accumulation of numerous grievances, religious fanaticism
and political blundering.
In colonial India, Sikh communal representation in the
political bodies had been guaranteed through the
establishment of separate communal electorates and the
reservation of seats on a communal basis.

This formula had

ensured a degree of Sikh communal representation but it had
also served as a form of identity reaffirmation for the
Sikhs.

However,

in a free India committed to secularism,

separate communal political representation was abolished.25
Hence,the abolition of separate electorates and introduction
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of joint electorates made the Sikhs a minority in Punjab
subservient to the Hindus, thereby increasing their
agitation for a separate state.26
Moreover,

in secular India, minority benefits enjoyed

by this community earlier specially in the army, were
abrogated.

Thus people who observed Sikh forms and symbols

for economic benefits gave them up.27
As a consequence of the partition, nearly 2.5 million
Sikhs, most of whom were prosperous, had to leave their
former homes and flee to India, resulting in a substantial
increase in the number of Sikhs in certain contiguous
regions. The economically disgruntled refugees in certain
compact areas gave birth to the idea of an autonomous Sikh
state.28
The "Green Revolution" was promulgated in Punjab during
the mid-sixties

(1965-66) with the use of the high yielding

Mexican wheat seeds.

The new technology was so effective

that it enabled Punjab, once a deficit state, which produced
3.39 million tonnes of food grain in 1966, to become a major
surplus producer in 197 6-77 when it's output exceeded 9.21
million tonnes of grain.29
Further, during the 1960s the prosperity of the Green
Revolution brought with it, another set of problems.
Migrant laborers from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar came in the
thousands to Punjab as farmhands, many eventually settled
here and enrolled on the voter lists, thus increasing the
76

agitation of the Sikhs who felt swamped in by the Hindus.30
The Shiromani Akali Dal was formed on December 14, 1920
during the days of the Gurudwara Reform Movement with
headquarters in the Golden Temple, at Amritsar.

However,

the Akali Dal emerged as a full-fledged political party in
the Punjab during the 193 6-37 elections held under the
Government of India Act of 193 5.31

To the present day we

find an Akali movement which had previously directed its
actions against the Mahants

(Hindu priests) controlling the

Sikh gurudwaras , vying for control of the Shiromani
Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (S.G.P.C., which controlled
the Gurudwaras).32

This Akali movement was of a social and

religious nature in origin, one aimed at winning control of
the S.G.P.C. and its vast resources.

With such resources,

it could help finance its candidates to the Akali Dal Party.
Virtually since its inception, factionalism and
splinter groups developed so that the Akali Dal was seldom,
if ever, a monolithic party able to command either the
complete allegiance of its followers, or to speak for the
entire Sikh community.

Nonetheless,

it consistently

dominates the S.G.P.C. within this competitive context.33
During the 19 3 0s the Akali Dal was divided into Master
Tara Singh's group, Baba Kharak Singh's group and Gyani Sher
Singh's group.34

However, following independence and

through the 1950s, Master Tara Singh and his faction within
the Akali Dal dominated with continual challenges from the
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Malwa Akali Dal.

The Sadh Sangat Board (Congress Sikhs),

and the Desh Bhagat (Communist Sikhs).

The individuals

involved subsequently changed, but the basic patterns of
internally contending groups continues.35
From the start of independence the Akali leader Master
Tara Singh decided that the only way to prevent modernism
and Hinduism from drowning the Sikhs' identity was to demand
official recognition as a separate community.

Hindu and

Sikh refugees from West Punjab (i.e. Pakistan) had to fight
to re-establish themselves in the truncated Indian Punjab,
and their struggle aroused communal prejudices.

But the

Akalis' claim that Sikhism was in danger received its
greatest boost from the movement for a Punjabi-speaking
state or Punjab Suba.36

Punjabi Hindus claimed that the

demand was communal.
The three main languages of the undivided Punjab (pre1947) had been Urdu, Hindu and various forms of Punjabi.
the three, Punjabi was the most widely spoken.

Of

The Akalis

argued that the state's language should be Punjabi written
in the Gurumukhi script which was not widely used outside
the Sikh religion institutions.

Because of the Punjabi Suba

Movement and the link between language and communalism,

in

the 1961 census many Punjabi speaking Hindus declared Hindu
as their mother tongue.37
After the election results from the 1947-1962 period in
the 1952 elections the Akali Dal had merged with the
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Congress party and 2 6 of its nominees ran on the Congress
ticket.38

Hence, out of the 186 seats contested, the

Congress party won 122 and the Akali Dal 3 3 seats.
In the 1957 electoral race, the Akali Dal did not
officially contest the elections and the Congress party held
onto 12 0 out of the 154 seats.
However, by the 1962 general elections in the Punjab,
the Akali Dal entered as an "independent political party"
and declared "war" against the Congress party over the
Punjabi Suba issue.39

Out of a total of 154 seats, the

Congress party won 90 and the Akali Dal 19 in this
election.40
When observing the electoral results of Punjab, we must
also note that the nature of the problem should indicate
changing territorial configurations.
After independence in 1947, a new state of PEPSU
(Punjab and East Patiala States Union) was created in
addition to a much smaller sized Punjab (with the Muslim
majority portion going to Pakistan).

In 1956 after numerous

demonstrations organized by the Akali Dal, PEPSU was merged
with Punjab, but the overwhelming Hindu province of Himachal
Pradesh was retained as a separate entity.

In the new

Punjab, a limited measure of internal autonomy was to be
given to two communities of the provincial legislature
representing the Punjabi and Hindu speaking regions.41
After its enormous victory in the 1959 S.G.P.C.
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elections, the Akali leaders once again interpreted their
victory as a mandate to begin their agitation for a Punjabi
Suba.42
Prime Minister Nehru remained adamantly opposed to the
Punjabi Suba until his death in 1964, but in 1966 his
daughter Indira Gandhi agreed to the formation of a Punjabi
speaking state.

The Punjabi Suba proved a hollow victory

for the Akalis because the Sikh vote was split between the
Congress and Akalis.

The only way they could form a

government was in alliance with the Hindu Jan Sangh party.43
The Congress party, with its cross-communal following, had
always had enough Sikhs in positions of leadership to make
it a powerful contender for electoral support from Sikhs.
Thus in the five elections to the Punjab legislative
assembly held between 1967 and 1980, the Congress party was
able to command support from a significant body of Sikh
voters, and as a result the Akali Dal was unable to get more
30 percent of the total vote.44
From the establishment of the Punjabi Suba in 1966, to
1980, the Akali Dal was able to govern the Punjab only with
the assistance of a coalition government, and at the same
time they had to contend with the Congress party's support
from Sikh voters in the Punjab.

In the mid-term election of

1969, the Akali Dal was again able to form a government with
the assistance of the Jan Sangh.45
However,

in the next election of the Punjab assembly in
80

1972, the Akali Dal was ousted from power by the Congress
party.

Following the Congress party's

historic defeat

after the imposition of the Emergency in 1977, the Akali Dal
again formed a government in the Punjab through an alliance
with the Janata party.

After the Congress party resumed

power in the center in 1980, it called fresh elections to
provincial assemblies and won 54 percent of the seats in the
Punjab legislature.46
The Akali party also viewed the massive influx of nonSikhs with alarm, because its chief instruments in getting
the Suba (district) was lost, when the Congress Government
more often than not, won at the polls.47
In April 1973, the Akalis passed the controversial
Anandpur Sahib Resolution in which the Sikhs were described
as a separate nation.

They also demanded greater autonomy

for the state, readjustment of its boundaries including many
Punjabi speaking areas of Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and
Raj isthan.48
Another issue of contention was that many Sikhs began
to feel that too much of their river water was being
parceled out to other states such as Haryana and Himachal
Pradesh.49
The city of Chandigarh also became an issue of
contention.

After Partition in 1947, Prime Minister

Jawaharhal Nehru, had decided that Amristar was too close to
the Pakistan border to be the capital of Punjab.
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Therefore

a new capital city of Chandigarh was built.

When the state

was divided along linguistic lines in 1966, into Punjab and
Haryana, Chandigarh served as the capital of both, and
housed the state assemblies and the secretariats of both
Punjab and Haryana.50
However, by the mid 1970s the Sikhs increased their
demands that the city of Chandigarh become Punjab's
exclusive capital.51
The Akali's wanted control of the country's Sikh
temples, or Gurudwaras, to come under a single authority.
They felt that the income which these Gurudwaras attracted,
(about 100 million pounds a year), would help finance the
Akali movement, and would also aid the increased
concentration power in one governing body.52
Sikhs called for the broadcast of their hymns over the
radio, and the ban on sale of meat, alcohol, and tobacco
around the vicinity of the Golden Temple.53
Finally, they wanted to be allowed to board airliners
with their nine inch Kirpans, the daggers they wore
according to their religious custom.54

In 1982 on August

4th and 20th two attempted hijackings of Indian Airline
planes were carried out by Sikh extremists, after which
carrying Kirpans (daggers) on board all Indian Airline
planes was prohibited.
Mrs. Gandhi herself contributed in some ways to the
radical wing of the Akali Dal.
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In 1972 the Congress party

ousted the Akali Dal from power in the Punjab, but after its
electoral defeat in 1977 it decidedly changed its course of
action.
Zail Singh, who had been chief minister of Punjab
during the 1972-77 years, advised Sanjay Gandhi (Mrs.
Gandhi's son) to try to break the back of the Akali Dal.55
In the late 197 0s the Akali Dal was dominated by three
men - Prakesh Singh Badal (who had succeeded Zail Singh as
Chief Minister, Harchand Singh Longowal, a religious teacher
who had led the agitation against the Emergency, and
Gurucharan Singh Tahra, a politician with communist
connections who headed the S.G.P.C.

Zail Singh knew that

displacing one of the Akali trinity would only lead to a
stronger alliance of the other two.

Hence, he recommended

that a new religious leader be brought into the picture to
discredit the traditional Akali Dal leadership.

The choice

eventually fell on Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who as head
of the Damdani Taksal

(an influential Sikh school) had a

ready made status in the Sikh community.56
As a rigid fundamentalist, Bhindranwale could
capitalize on the compromises with Sikh interests that the
Akali Dal were bound to make to stay in power.

However, he

needed an issue, a cause to rally behind and both Sanjay and
Zail Singh found this in the Nirankaris (a heretical sect of
Sikhs who are very influential in the Punjabi trading
community).

They also needed a party to promote
83

Bhindranwale and harass the Akalis.

On April 13, 1978, a

new party called the Dal Khalsa (the party of the pure) was
formed.

Bhindranwale was never openly associated with the

Dal Khalsa, and until his death maintained that he was a
"man of religion, not a politician."57
When Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in 1980 she
continued to support Bhindranwale until he became involved
with the murders of Baba Gurbachan Singh (the leader of the
Nirankari sect), Lala Jagat Narain (the proprietor of a
chain of newspapers) and Santokh Singh (a rival Sikh
politician).58
Darbara Singh, the Congress Chief Minister of Punjab
had insisted that Bhindranwale be arrested, but the central
government feared there would be violence because of the
larger number of Sikhs who had gathered to protect him.
On September 20, 1981, after the second murder,
Bhindranwale surrendered to the police.

On October 14,

1981, less than a month after his arrest, Zail Singh told
parliament that there was no evidence that Bhindranwale was
involved in the murders , and the decision

to

release Bhindranwale was taken by government.59
However, after the third slaying, Bhindranwale had
fallen out with the Congress and a new bidder for his
support had entered the ring, the Akali Dal.60

It was after

this stage that the Akali Dal slowly grouped into two
sections —

the more radical one followed Bhindranwale and
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the moderate elements swore their allegiances to Longowal,
the President of the Akali Dal.61
During the imposition of the Emergency (declared on
June 26, 1975), when Mrs. Gandhi had suspended all
constitutional rights of individuals, most Akali agitators
were jailed, and naturally during the rival Janata rule (the
only political party to defeat the Congress party since
independence) were resurrected to high offices in their
state.62

Unfortunately, Janata power dissolved within a

couple of years and in the 198 0 elections, the Congress
Party routed the Akali-Janata combination in Punjab.63
Akalis now out of power and with small prospects of
regaining it through the electoral process, decided to
destabilize the Congress Government through agitation.64
They pointed to the 197 3 Anandpur Resolution out and
proclaimed it as a charter of Sikh demands, however, tagging
along another 45 additional demands.

The Anandpur Sahib

Resolution demanded a readjustment of state boundaries to
include in Punjab the Punjabi speaking areas of neighboring
Haryana, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh.

Now they also

wanted Chandigrah to be the exclusive capitol of Punjab, a
fairer allocation of river water to Punjab and referred
vaguely to a separate "Sikh nation."65

They followed this

up with a series of agitations such as Nahar Roko (blocking
the canals), Rasta Roko (blocking road traffic), Kam roko
(stopping work), and finally declared a Dharma Yudh
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(righteous war) from Amristar against the central government
by sending over 1,000 volunteers a day to court arrest.66
Alongside this passive resistance movement, a parallel
terrorist one began to develop under the leadership of
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.67
On May 23, 1981, The London Times reported that "there
is a rumble at present being felt from a small minority of
people who have reactivated old separatist sentiments and
are calling for a Sikh homeland to be called Khalistan."68
The publication astutely warned that most Sikhs did not
support the idea of a separate homeland, but a mishandling
of the situation could drive the moderates over to the
extremist cause.69
Unfortunately, events moved rather quickly from this
point and the daily exchange between the Sikhs, Nirankaris,
and Hindus only worsened relations.

On September 22nd,

twelve days after the murder of an 82 year old newspaper
editor who had written critically of resurgent Sikh
separation, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was arrested.70

Yet

it was not clear that he was at the forefront of the Sikh
secessionist campaign, which was led by a few young
university graduates.71

Nevertheless, these extremists were

opposed to the moderates of the Akali Party headed by
Harchand Singh Longowal.72
On September 29, 1981, becoming bolder, Sikh militants
hijacked an Indian Airlines plane carrying 111 passengers in
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Amristar.73

The Dal Khalsa (militant faction of the Akali

Dal) claimed responsibility for this hijacking and demanded
the release of Sikh militants from Indian jails.74
Immediately following the hijacking, the police crackdown in
Punjab led to the arrest of more than 70 people.75
Unfortunately the violence continued to increase throughout
the months.

Trouble spread to 2 0 Punjabi towns, Mrs. Gandhi

belatedly elected a "crisis committee" to handle the
situation.76
On August 5th and 21st, 1982, two further attempts at
hijacking an Indian Airlines plane were made.77

Mrs.

Gandhi, trying the course of appeasement, ordered Darbara
Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab to release 3 0,000 Sikh
prisoners.

Matters only went downhill when a clash between

those released and the police ensued in Kapurthala.78
To bring a halt to the violence, Mrs. Gandhi's Indian
government appealed for negotiations, stating "it is only
through negotiations and a cordial atmosphere that issues
can be resolved."79

The Akalis rejected the government's

appeals and announced the launching of a Sikh Holy War on
November 4, 1982.80

Mrs. Gandhi now began to fear a

backlash from Haryana, which shared the common capital of
Chandigarh with Punjab.81

Mrs. Gandhi still tried to

appease the Sikhs and allowed them to carry their Kirpans on
board aircraft.83

Sikh leaders, now still bolder, called

this an "eyewash" and continued to encourage militants to
87

court arrest.

On April 25, 198 3, Sikh extremists shot and

killed Mr. Avtar Singh Atwal, a Deputy Inspector General of
Police in Amristar.

Mr. Atwal was on the extremists' hit-

list because he was conducting inguiries into various acts
of violence by Sikh militants.83
President's Rule was imposed on October 6, 198 3.
Violence once again erupted in this state.84

As clashes

between Hindus and Sikhs escalated, the government moved in
paramilitary forces to try and curtail the bloodshed.85

The

government also banned the use of motorcycles which had
become the terrorists principal means of communication and
escape.86
In April 1984, a brief respite between the government
of India and the agitators was announced.

The government

announced the amendment of Article 2 5 of the Indian
Constitution.

The constitution stated:

"The reference to Hindus shall be construed as including
a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or
Buddhist religion..."
Sikhs objected to being grouped with Hindus.

The

government acknowledged that a re-wording of Article 2 5 to
identify Sikhs as a separate group was going to be made.

In

return the Akali Dal leaders would call off the week long
agitation planned.87
Unfortunately, violence by extremists was not curbed,
and on April 5, 1984 New Delhi introduced stringent measures
of detention without trial.88
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Following Sikh attacks on

Hindus in Punjab, Hindus in Haryana began reacting violently
to having Sikhs in their midst.89
Violence also spread between the Bhindranwale
(extremists) and Longowal

(moderate) camps, and the Indian

government was beginning to take seriously the allegations
that Pakistan was involved with Sikh guerrillas.90
Newspapers also claimed that some Pakistanis dressed as
Sikhs were found in India among the Sikh warrior class, the
Nihangs.

A number of arrested Nihangs were found to have

been circumcised, a ritual conducted only by

Muslims, not

Sikhs or Hindus on the Indian subcontinent.91
On April 15, 1984, Sikh terrorists conducted a well
coordinated attack in which more than thirty railway
stations were set on fire.

The aim of the attacks,

according to the United News of India, was to disrupt
transport in the troubled state.92
A week later, on April 23, 1984, fifteen Sikh youths
rode through the city of Amarkot and opened fire upon
turbanless Hindus and Hindu shops.

After a few stunning

moments the bolder Hindus seized guns "and began loosing off
a few blasts of their own."93

Three Hindus were killed and

ten were badly injured.
The Golden Temple of Amritsar, the Holy Shrine of
Sikhism, was first turned into an armed camp and later into
a battleground by the warring Sikh factions led by Sant
Harchand Singh Longowal and Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.
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Longowal, the leader of the official agitation to gain Sikh
demands insisted that the campaign was not anti-Hindu.

"Our

demands are Punjabi demands, not simply Sikh demands."94
Bhindranwale, on the other hand, made no such
concessions.

He wanted to make right earlier wrongs

committed by "Hindu imperialism" against the Sikhs.

He had

been quoted as saying, if every Sikh killed thirty-five
Hindus then Khalistan would automatically appear.95
In May of 1984, the crisis of Punjabi regionalism
reached new proportions.

On May 8, 1984, Sikh rebels

assassinated a village leader in Punjab's Ferozepur
district.

Followers of the two main Sikh factions exchanged

gunfire inside a shrine in the Kapurthala district of
Punjab.

When Indian troops clashed with the extremists in

the area, eight people were killed and sixteen extremists
were arrested.96

On May 12, 1984, Sikh extremists shot and

killed a newspaper editor Ramesh Chander in Jullunder,
Punjab (two years earlier, they had shot his father Jagat
Narain).

Mr. Chander was the third editor killed in Punjab

in 1984.9^

Bhindranwale had been accused of complicity in

the murder of Jagat Narain and was released only after riots
in which twenty-one people died, and the central government
intervened.96

On May 24, Longowal threatened a Mahatma

Gandhi style "non-cooperation movement" against the
government.99

Thus, when violence escalated and no other

solution seemed appropriate or adequate, the Indian
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government decided to launch "Operation Blue Star."100
It was common knowledge that all kinds of weapons and
armaments used to kill their opponents were hidden by the
extremists in the Golden Temple.101

India Today suggested

that no decision could have been more painful to Mrs. Gandhi
and her advisors than "Operation Blue Star— the biggest and
most significant counter-terrorist action undertaken
anywhere in the world."102

The consequences shocked the

world.
On June 1, 1984, a curfew was clamped on the Holy
City.103

Within 24 hours nearly 70,000 troops called from

the army and paramilitary forces had taken up predetermined
positions, to prevent any further terrorists from entering
the temple and to keep away the mobs.104

However, at least

ten people were killed and twenty-five injured in a sevenhour gun battle between Indian security forces and militant
Sikhs in Amristar.
On June 2, 1984, Mrs. Gandhi went on the air in a T.V.
broadcast declaring that the government would put down
terrorism.105

June 3, 1984, saw the entire state "tightly

secured" with the Indian troops operating on the
psychological level of flushing out, rather than resorting
to a full-fledged military operation.106

Quick to respond,

the extremists made their intentions clear by lobbing
grenades at the Indian Army outside the Golden Temple and
maintaining a heavy fusillade with medium machine guns.107
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On June 4th, it was clear to the General Officer commanding
the army that they faced a determined insurgent army charged
with religious fervour, and not an armed rabble as had
previously been thought.108
On June 5, 1984, the siege had been laid for 60
hours.109

Ideally it would have been more useful to

continue the siege, due to the growing mob violence outside
Amritsar an officer leading the operations noted: to defend
the Temple, something drastic would have had to ensue to
prevent a dozen Jallianwalla Baghs around Amritsar.110

"It

was all very nice to talk of effective, determined fire, but
there is a limit to how many people you can kill out of a
mob."111

It was this that prompted the generals to choose

what one of them later called the devil's alternative: the
storming of the Temple complex.
By dusk of June 5th "every inch of the temple was
covered with machine gun fire from the radicals within the
temple.

It was utterly frustrating for the soldiers who saw

their comrades die under fire from the temple and yet could
not shoot back.112

Since Bhindranwale and his key

lieutenants had decided to fight the last battle from the
Akal Takht, it was decided to overcome the Akal Takht
defense by using artillery fire and cannons to bring down
the outer facade, pillars and canopy of the building.113
The Indian Army soon overran the machine gun positions and
as Bhindranwale tried to take cover, he was killed in a
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burst of gun fire.114
India Today in its long term analysis stated that with
the death of Bhindranwale and his key lieutenants, the back
of the present extremist movement had been broken.115
Without a charismatic leader to inspire them, the remaining
extremists hiding in the country side would have little
scope for major mischief, according to the respected
magazine.

But the danger lay on two different fronts.

First, the weapons found in the Golden Temple clearly
indicated the involvement of both the Chinese and the
Pakistanis.

Hence, India had to be cautious about foreign

intervention in her domestic matters.

Second, many Punjabis

felt that notwithstanding all the problems the Sikh
terrorists had caused, the Indian army's violation of the
Golden Temple was not justified.

They felt that the "Sikh

community had been given a tight slap across the face," an
action which could lead to a solidly alienated Sikh sub
nationality, giving fillip to the Khalistan demand.116
Even the London Times, on June 9, 1984 headlined
"Amristar- Gandhi's Falkland Factor?," and suggested that
the "swift, clean, surgical operation" was bound to have its
effect in terms of the voter turnout.117

In the view of the

Times. on the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi's action represented a
major blow against communalism, regionalism and
secessionism, and in favor of secularism and the maintenance
of India's unity.
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Hence, no one anticipated what took place, least of all
Mrs. Gandhi or her advisors.

On October 31, 1984 the Indian

Prime Minister was assassinated by two of her Sikh security
guards.118

The entire nation received the news with shock

and disbelief. Many felt that "...Certain forces were now
active to destroy the democratic system by indulging in
individual terrorism and violence... and that the whole
country would fight against the anti-national and anti
democratic forces."119
In reaction to her death, overjoyed Sikhs danced, sang,
and set off fireworks in London.120

However, irate mobs of

Hindus took to the streets in many of the major cities in
India attacking private and public vehicles, and setting
them on fire.121

In West Bengal the help of the army was

sought to aid the civil authorities in curtailing mob
violence against Sikhs.122
Rajiv, Indira Gandhi's eldest son, was sworn in as
Prime Minister immediately.

He appealed to the people for

calm and an exercise of "maximum restraint" in this moment
of profound grief.123
The London Times suggested that the assassination could
lead to the collapse of Indian unity.

The cult of the

mother was widely prevalent in India they argued, and
reminded readers of the late Prime Minister's campaign
slogan: "Indira is India: India is Indira."124

Could anyone

hold together the infinitely fissiparous parts of the Indian
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union as she did?
compared with hers?
India?

Could anyone provide the leadership that
Was anyone else capable of governing

Did the murder of Mrs. Gandhi mark "both the passing

of an extraordinary leader and the beginning of a dangerous
political passage for the world's largest democracy,
enquired journalist."125
"Rajiv Gandhi's first task," stated the Philadelphia
Enquirer, "will be to demonstrate whether he can extend the
healing hand his mother often spoke of to calm Hindu-Sikh
tensions."126
the task.

Fortunately, Rajiv Gandhi proved to be up to

In July, 1985, he had managed to persuade several

Sikh leaders to come to New Delhi for talks.127
Although radical Sikhs denounced the settlement, the
accord which resulted from these talks went a long way
toward meeting several of the Sikhs' demands.

The

government's main concession concerned the city of
Chandigarh, which had served as the common capital for both
Punjab and Haryana since 19 66.

Chandigarh would now become

part of Punjab and serve as its capital alone.

A new

capital would be built for Haryana and a tribunal would
select Hindi speaking areas in Punjab that would be
incorporated into Haryana.

The change would virtually

ensure "that Sikhs will enjoy more political and economic
power in Punjab..."128
The government also agreed to pay compensation to the
families for all those killed in Sikh related disturbances
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since August 1982.129

Rajiv Gandhi also promised to

"withdraw" the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in Punjab,
which permitted search and arrest without warrant.

Another

long standing Sikh grievance - the demand for a greater
share of river waters for irrigation was submitted to a
tribunal which was to deliver its report within six
months.130
Another major Akali Dal gain was the government's
agreement to consider a national law to regulate the
function of the thousands of Sikh shrines, scattered around
the country.

Hence, we find that the Sikhs gained far more

than they gave up, under P.M. Rajiv Gandhi.131
Rajiv moved to placate Sikh bitterness fed by the
Golden Temple raid and the violence against the Sikhs by
Hindus outraged by his mother's assasination.

Approval of

this accord marked a major breakthrough in an effort to end
this Punjabi controntation.

Mr. Longowal the moderate

leader who signed the accord stated: "The morcha has
ended."132
Thus a major political crisis had been resolved by a
relatively inexperienced Prime Minister who had used every
effort to bring peace in this troubled region.

Rajiv Gandhi

immediately realized the past mistakes of his mother Indira
Gandhi, and worked diligently to change that situation.
"Luck, political manoeuvering and willingness to take risks"
helped produce the historic accord that was reached.133
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Arjun Singh the Governor of Punjab stated vehemently,

"we

will not allow anybody to disturb the peace at this stage.
It is the general will of the people to see that these
things do not occur."134
Hence, once again the Centre through its political
manoeuvering, adroitly steered the situation away from
violence and towards peaceful resolution between Punjab and
New Delhi.

These new methods of approaching the Sikh

crisis, and a willingness to compromise aided the
acceptability of the Centre's control, reach and powers to
resolve the conflict in this region.

There was relief that

one of "India's worst crises appeared to be coming to an
end.1,135
The Statesman reported that this was truly a tremendous
achievement for a young and relatively inexperienced Prime
Minister and Sant Harchant Singh Longowal, still head of the
Akali Dal, hailed this settlement and claimed emphatically
that "the period of confrontation is over."136

Analysis of the Situation
In analyzing the situation, we must note that beside
the growth of communalism in Punjab the situation was
exacerbated by miscalculations on the part of the Congress
leadership.
There can be no doubt that the foundations of strong
regional identity are present in Punjab.
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Language,

religion, a sense of history, etc., all serve to reinforce
such an identity.

But the crisis of 1984 was not a product

of regionalism alone; it was a product of regionalism fueled
to the point of explosion by slights and oversights, and
grievances ignored by the Central Government for over three
decades, and in the end, by positive reinforcement of the
Prime Minister herself in the strengthening of the most
radical factions in the regional leadership.
Bhindranwale was the product of Congress politics
rather than Akali ones.

In March 1977 there was a general

election which ended her emergency rule.

On March 21, 1977,

the London Times reported that "Mrs. Gandhi loses her seat
in Congress disaster."

In 1975 Mrs. Gandhi had declared an

Emergency to save the country from chaos fomented by
opposition parties and to give it instead,
and stable government.

firm discipline

She vehemently repudiated the charge

that the maintenance of her own rule was as strong a motive.
However, the March 1977 elections displayed that her rule,
her leadership, and her Emergency were rejected.

The

Congress Party, for the first time since independence,

lost

control of the government in New Delhi, and Mrs. Gandhi was
put out of office by her overwhelming defeat in her own
constituency.137

Later in 1977 when the Congress Party lost

Punjab in state elections which were called in the wake of
Mrs. Gandhi's own fall from power at the center, a coalition
led by the moderate faction of the Akali's took over.138
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During this time, Bhindranwale and the radical elements of
the Akali Party were consequently encouraged by Mrs. Gandhi
and the other leading Congress politicians to demonstrate
against the Akali government's secularism.

This campaign

reached its climax when many Bhindranwale supporters died
while trying to storm a meeting of heretical Nirankaris,
reported the London Times.139
After three years of rule by the opposition Janata
Party, on January 8th 198 0, Mrs. Gandhi won a landslide
victory in the Indian general elections.

The governments of

Mr. Desai and Mr. Charan Singh (1977-1979) had not taken any
serious action to curb price rises nor did they attempt to
educate the public about their causes during the long
election campaign.140

Again in the wake of the general

election, state elections were held.

Hence, the Congress

Party regained power in the Punjab in the 198 0, and
Bhindranwale lost his "nuisance value." Unfortunately,

for

Mrs. Gandhi, he refused to be put back into his box.141
fundamentalism had found its time.

His

The Akalis, to

counteract Bhindranwale's strong fundamentalist challenge
were forced to adopt more extreme postures.

Now in

opposition, the Akalis launched a campaign for state
autonomy.

Thus, a serious miscalculation on Mrs. Gandhi's

part, regarding Bhindranwale's political use, eventually
cost the country thousands of lives.
Also, the growth of Sikh fundamentalism was ignored by
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the Congress leadership, who made no attempt to understand
and curb this movement until it was totally out of hand.
Though it may look simplistic, conceptually,
fundamentalism in Punjab's context could be described as an
amalgam of religious fanaticism, separatism, and
terrorism.142

The Fundamentalists' deep-seated hatred

against the Nirankaris culminating in the assassination of
Baba Gurbachan Singh, the spiritual head of the Nirankaris;
their preference for baptized Sikhs over all others, spirit
of intolerance toward all voices of dissent and finally
their stance on the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, led

them to

make demands of independence.143
Tully and Jacob conclude that it was Indira Gandhi's
Congress Party which launched Bhindranwale, and it was her
government which allowed him to usurp its role in the
Punjab.144

If she had arrested Bhindranwale after the

assassination of Deputy Inspector General of Police Atwal,
on April 25, 198 3, there would have been no assault on the
Akal Takht.145

Thus, it was Mrs. Gandhi's "indecisiveness"

which aided the tragedy of Amritsar.146
Finally, we may note that Mrs. Gandhi actively
encouraged the "darbar" or court around her.147 This durbar
had a stultifying effect on the institutions of India.

All

power derived from the court in Delhi, but the courtiers
often exercised their power independently.148
the fawners and flatterers rose to
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Inevitably,

the top and the

independent-minded sank to the bottom.149

Hence, often the

truth was hidden from the Prime Minister who made decisions
based on false promises.
Harji Malik in states that "the politics of alienation"
was in process and actively encouraged by the Congress (I)
Party for political reasons.150

He stated that though we

play lip service to our much vaunted "unity in diversity,"
Indian realpolitik is self-destructive in its intolerance of
diversity, encouraged by the "deliberately cultivated bogey
that diversity is synonymous with disintegration.1,151

Hindu

fundamentalism, often explained as the "backlash" to Muslim
and Sikh fundamentalism,

is accepted by the majority

community as their "right."152
Malik argues that Hindu-Sikh friction in the Punjab was
essentially a power struggle between the Akali Dal and the
Congress.153

Playing the old colonial "divide and rule"

game, the Congress strategy was to split the Punjab
electorate by encouraging both Hindu and Sikh
communalism.154

Covert government support to splinter and

fringe groups amongst the Sikhs and Nirankaris was also part
of their plans.155

Apparently, Malik feels that P.M.

"Indira Gandhi and her government did not want a solution.
Repeatedly, with the negotiations on the verge of success,
the government reneged, on some excuse or the other."156
Malik states that the Congress party relied on the mass
support of religious minorities but, for a variety of socio101

economic reasons this base was gradually eroded.

After the 1977

election, a new appraisal, based on the majority Hindu vote as
the safest possible vote bank, gradually took over.157
Malik argues further that another evil promulgated
against the Sikhs was a well-planned disinformation campaign.
The disinformation campaign described the Sikh sense of identity
as a British "creation" claiming that if the British had not laid
stress on differences between Sikhs and Hindus, Sikhism would
have relapsed back into the Hindu fold.158

Deliberately put on

the defensive, Sikhs were forced to proclaim that they were not
secessionists.
purpose,

The disinformation campaign served its dual

it made the entire Sikh community suspect all over the

country and increasingly alienated the Sikhs from the national
mainstream of the community.159

However, having created its

extreme "Frankenstein" the government lost control of events.160
It was only with the change in New Delhi's leadership
that a metamorphosis in style and approach under the new Prime
Minister (kajiv Gandhi) willing to make adjustments and
compromises, that the situation was seemingly resolved.
September 1985 was the first time since the 192 0s that
the Akali Dal had won a majority on its own in the Punjab.The
voters in Punjab elected Sikh leaders who denounced extremism and
pledged to work out their problems peacefully.

Many politicians

predicted that a party led by Sikhs would have a better chance
than others to curb the violence in Punjab.

Thus Rajiv Gandhi

had once again managed to take control and help shape a
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potentially dangerous situation and bring the Punjabi leadership
under New Delhi's wings.
Conclusion
In concluding, we have to take a middle path and note
that the Congress government was certainly not beyond blame, but
the claim of harassment of all Sikhs, and a well-planned
disinformation campaign is not supported by what we know as the
facts.
In the Punjab it appears that Mrs. Gandhi and the
Congress leaders miscalculated the usefulness of Bhindranwale in
causing a schism in the Akali Dal.

Moreover, once Bhindranwale

had made his position clear, Mrs. Gandhi failed to take the
necessary action against him until Operation Blue Star.
Operation Blue Star was the ultimate signal of the failure of the
government's earlier policies with respect to Punjab regionalism,
and in its turn, it produced a Sikh backlash, which was followed
by Hindu reprisals as the drama of political errors played out
its awful logic.

After 1985, with Rajiv at the helm, moderate

Sikh demands were satisfied with the signing of the accord, and a
measure of control has returned back into the hands of both, the
Punjabi government and the Centre in New Delhi.
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Ill

Conclusion
In concluding this thesis we find that the theme of
Indian politics has been one of "unity in diversity."

This

diversity, portrayed abundantly in the introduction, shows
sharp distinctions between various tribes, religious, ethnic
and cultural groups.

Today with the help of the Indian

government's educational and cultural programs and the
improvement in mass communication and media exposure, these
groups must reside in closer proximity to each other.
Previously, under the British Raj most groups lived
with little knowledge of others, hence differences flared up
only upon occasional contact.

The British policy of divide

and rule always worked well in the R a j .
Governmental programs and educational facilities in
independent India not only aided the backward schedule
castes and tribes but also the Punjabis who had lost their
homeland in the 1947 partition.

Perhaps a feeling of guilt

pervaded governmental consciousness that extraordinary
measures were needed to aid those disadvantaged groups.
Yet, when problems arose, the government's lack of swift
action to tackle the issues and its support of partisan
politics over national issues only exacerbated the
disgruntled minorities, who took actions into their own
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hands.
Neither the Sikh problem nor the North East Indian
issue are totally resolved today, and India is only now
begining to recover from Mrs. Gandhi's assassination and the
void in leadership that created.

Though her son Rajiv has

stepped in and shown promise, the problems of ethnicity are
ever present.
In 1947 India promised to maintain a democratic form of
government, and has kept this promise (except for a short
period during which Emergency Rule was invoked).

In a

democracy "all men are created equal" and this equality was
extended to the previously disadvantaged groups.

Freedom of

speech, as far as possible is also maintained so that the
various groups and their grievances can be aired publicly.
Hence, the Central Government tries to maintain some kind of
balance in its dealings with its opponents.

However, being

a democracy, special electorates such as those previously
maintained in the Punjab which caused the Sikhs to feel
disadvantaged had to be abolished.

Given such conditions,

a new Punjabi state was created in 1966 with the Sikhs
constituting a fifty-five percent majority.
In delving into the problem of regionalism in the two
case studies, we find that the "power" factor appears as the
common denominator in both the case studies.

The loss of

power felt by the Sikhs in losing control of their temples,
special electorates, river water and a sense of identity
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developed into a feeling of hopelessness.

Similarly in the

North-East, the illegal migration, loss of jobs, land, and
eventually what they perceived as an electoral majority
brought on feelings of powerlessness.

Therefore, when the

Indian government did little to allay these fears, or by
their actions making them worse, both minorities decided to
take action into their own hands.
The two case studies support the view that when the
leadership in New Delhi is slow to respond, and acts in a
calculating and manipulative manner,

fostering partisan

rather than national interests in its dealings with regional
issues, trouble ensues.

This has been abundantly

illustrated in both the case studies.
In North East India, rising expectations were blunted
and the root cause appeared to point to the increasing tide
of "foreigners" appropriating greater portions of land and
jobs.

New Delhi was extremely slow to respond to these

regional problems because of the Congress Party's dependence
on minority votes which included these foreigners.

Thus the

center's apathy toward swiftly resolving these issues
brought on years of civil strife, Naga insurgency, Metei
chauvinism and Mizo rebellion in these regions.
Similarly, in the Punjab, New Delhi's inertia towards
dealing with the problems of parcelling the river waters and
the control of Sikh temples only helped to aggravate the
situation.

However, the center's early encouragement of
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Jarnail Sangh Bhindrandwale for its own partisan purposes,
and their failure to curb his increasing demands eventually
led to Operation Bluestar and the assassination of Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi.
Yet, when the leadership in New Delhi is serious about
addressing these problems and decides to tackle the issues
at hand we find that the situation shows marked
improvements.
With Rajiv Gandhi at the helm, accords were reached in
both Assam and the Punjab in 1985.

New elections based on a

pre-1985 electorate was promised in Assam and the center
worked toward decreasing civil strife in this region.

A

caretaker government was to be in control before new
elections were undertaken.

In addition, certain unspecified

legislative and administrative safeguards were promised by
the central government to protect the cultural, social, and
linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people.
In Punjab, an accord with the moderates concluded
months of uncertainty and mayhem in this region.

New

Delhi's concessions concerning Chandigarh made it the sole
capital of Punjab.

The central government agreed to pay

compensation to families for all those killed in Sikh
related disturbances since 1982.

Rajiv Gandhi also promised

to withdraw the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in Punjab
which permitted search and arrest without a warrant.
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Thus, we find that regionalism is a serious problem in
India which can be contained when the leadership in New
Delhi is responsive and quick to act, however, if the center
is manipulative and slow to respond, regional outbursts can
become a tedious and protracted problem.

Hence, the key to

the problem lies in the hands of the central leadership in
New Delhi and their approach to dealing with the regions.
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